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INTRODUCTION
When the Framers of the Constitution settled that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,"1 it is unlikely that
they foresaw the protection applying to any form of communication
other than print or oral speech. While the Framers could not have
predicted the emergence of radio and television broadcasts, telephone
communications, cable television, and now the Internet as forms of
mass communication, it does not necessarily follow that they would
have denied these unforeseen mediums First Amendment protec-
tion.2 To the contrary, the Framers would have encouraged free
speech and the open exchange of ideas in any new form of communi-
cation that might develop over time.3
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Ohe First Amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make
no Iaw respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. The First
Amendment binds not only Congress, but also all branches of both the federal and state
governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlowv. NewYork,
268 U.S. 652, 664-66 (1925) (holding that First Amendment guarantees are fundamental
element of "liberty" protected by Fourteenth Amendment).
2. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6(5th ed. 1995)
(noting that Framers' intention for First Amendment to protect speech and press does not mean
that they intended to exclude movies, digital recordings, Internet, etc.); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Address at the
First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991) <http://cpsr.org/cpsr/
free.speech/tribesconstitutionsyberspace.txt> (arguing that while Constitution's architecture
might seem "quaintly irrelevant.., in the world as reconstituted by the microchip," Framers
were wise in their creation of our Constitution with a "framework for all seasons, a truly
astonishing document whose principles are suitable for all times and all technological
landscapes").
3. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.6 (arguing that policies behind First
Amendment support coverage of all forms of media, and that if Framers could have foreseen
modem methods of communications, they would have included them under First Amendment
protection because doing so would promote its policies); Tribe, supra note 2 (arguing that
"technologies familiar to the Constitution's authors and ratifiers... do not exhaust the threats
against which the Constitution's core values must be protected").
1997] RENO V. ACLU 1947
In recent years, the rapid emergence of the Internet has brought
with it the most accessible, dynamic, and democratic form of mass
communication in history.4 In many ways the Internet embodies the
democratic ideals underpinning the United States' constitutional
framework.5 It provides an outlet for a cacophony of ideas with
virtually no geographic, economic, social, or political restraints, giving
a voice to the People in a way the Constitution's Framers could only
have dreamed possible.
6
The Internet is still in its nascent stages, and like print, broadcast-
ing, telephone, and cable before it, it is a developing form of mass
communication that will require First Amendment protection from
governmental intrusion.7 In 1996, Congress enacted the first piece of
legislation specifically designed to regulate the previously untamed
4. SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), ajJZ 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(Dalzell,J., filing supporting opinion) ("It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has
achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this
country-and indeed the world-has yet seen."); Deanna Robinson, Court Acknowledges Internet
Role in New World Order, THE OREGONIAN, June 14, 1996, at C7 (arguing that Internet is only
medium that permits realization of United Nation's idealistic statement that "not only does
everyone have the right to freedom of opinion and expression, but that this right includes
freedom 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers' (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948))); see also infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (describing Internet's
predicted impact as an emerging form of mass communication).
5. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
6. See, eg,Jerry Berman & DanielJ. Weitzner, Abundance and User Controk Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE LJ. 1619, 1624
(1995) (suggesting that decentralized nature of Internet removes economic barriers to entry into
.marketplace of ideas" which previously prevented realization of First Amendment ideal); Fred
H. Cate, Indecency, Ignorance, and Intolerance: The First Amendment and the Regulation of Electronic
Expression, 1995 J. ONLINE L. 5, 1 66 (Dec. 1995) <http://www.wm.edu/law/FacAdmin/
publications/jol/cate2.hnl> (observing that structure of Internet makes the medium an
egalitarian forum of communication where "the real test of expression and ideas is their own
value, not the status or affiliation of their source"); Robert Kline, Freedom of Speech on theElectronic
Village Green: Applying the First Amendment Lessons of Cable Television to the Internet, 6 CoRNELLJ.L.
& PUBL. POLY 23, 24-25 (1996) (positing that Internet, "a wide open, interactive frontier that
has no central control figure" and allows speech at such minimal cost, "provides for the
exchange of ideas on a massive scale on a variety of topics limited only by the human
imagination"); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE LJ. 1805, 1846-47
(1995) (arguing that Internet is first medium that truly allows goals and premises of First
Amendmentjurisprudence to be reaized);Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, BALTIMORE SUN,
June 28, 1996, at 15A (observing that Internet, more than any other form of communication,
fulfills "Oliver Wendell Holmes' romantic metaphor of a perfectly deregulated marketplace of
ideas ... [by] ... reducing the costs of entry for both speakers and listeners and creating
relative equality among" all participants).
7. See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 6, at 1636-37 (recognizing likelihood that
government will attempt to regulate content on Internet, as evidenced "by taking decisive and
dangerous steps against the perceived growth of sexually explicit content in the new media");
WILUAMIJ. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE,JR., A FRAMvEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELEcrRONIc COMMERCE 25
(July 1, 1997), available at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm> (arguing that
"unnecessary regulation could cripple the growth and diversity of the Internet").
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frontier of cyberspace:8 the Communications Decency Act ("CDA").9
The Act imposed criminal penalties on those who transmit or display
obscene, indecent, or patently offensive material over the Internet. 10
In Reno v. ACLU,"1 however, the Supreme Court followed two
district court decisions by striking down the CDA as unconstitutionally
overbroad. 2 The Court applied a "medium-specific" analysis, the
hallmark of its First Amendment jurisprudence regarding different
forms of mass communication,13 and determined that the Internet
does not embody any of the characteristics that, when present in
other forms of communication, has led the Court to qualify the level
of First Amendment protection applied to the medium. 4 Perhaps
most significantly, though, the Court recognized in its opinion that
the Internet, and the egalitarian ethos it fosters, is a medium ideally
suited to accomplish what Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes termed the "marketplace of ideas."
15
This Comment considers where the Internet fits in the spectrum of
communication mediums for First Amendment protection, and
examines how the Supreme Court's holding in Reno v. ACLU will
impact the world's newest, most exciting form of communication.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the protections granted by the
First Amendment and examines how those protections are limited or
expanded depending on each medium's unique characteristics. Part
8. The term "cyberspace," first used by cyberpunk novelist William Gibson, has come to
define the nonphysical "place," including the Internet, where electronic communication takes
place. See Tribe, supra note 2 (describing cyberspace as "a place without physical walls or even
physical dimensions where ordinary telephone conversations 'happen,' where voice-mail and e-
mail messages are stored and sent back and forth, and where computer-generated graphics are
transmitted and transformed, all in the form of interactions.., among countless users, and
between users and the computer itself').
9. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
(110 Stat.) 56, 133 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223).
10. See infra Part II.B (discussing legislative history and analysis of CDA).
11. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (holding that governmental regulation of content of
speech on Intemet is outside bounds of constitutional tradition, particularly when considering
the "dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas" and the profound interest "in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society").
12. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The CDA was struck down earlier at the
district court level in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997), and in Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
13. See infra Part .C (discussing medium-specific analysis and its application to print,
broadcast, telephone, and cable communications).
14. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44 (noting that factors such as a history of extensive
government regulation, scarcity of frequencies, or an invasive nature, are not present in
cyberspace (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969)).
15. See id. at 2351 (noting that expansion of medium contradicts argument that citizens are
being driven away from Internet because of risk of exposure to harmful material).
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II analyzes the use of existing laws and regulations to stem the
perceived tide of criminal activity on the Internet, and examines
Congress' enactment of the CDA as a panacea for the Internet's ills.
Part III examines the subsequent challenges to the CDA and the
Supreme Court's holding in Reno v. ACLU. Part IV considers the
ramifications of the Court's decision on the future of the Internet,
and offers an alternative to the Court's use of medium-specific analysis
when considering the constitutionality of laws restricting freedom of
speech in the future. Finally, this Comment concludes that, as the
United States and the world enter a new age of information and
communication, the right to free speech would be best protected by
a new First Amendmentjurisprudence that grants all forms of speech
the highest level of constitutional protection, regardless of the
medium through which they are communicated.
I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FORMS OF MASS COMMUNICATION
A. Freedom of Speech: Rights and Limitations
In the United States, the freedom of speech is the touchstone of
individual liberty and, in turn, democracy. 6 Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that the primary goal of the First
Amendment is to guarantee a "marketplace of ideas," where truth and
honest debate emerge from a multiplicity of voices."7 The market-
16. See, eg., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 44849 (1991) (holding that one of First
Amendment's central goals is promotion of the "individual dignity and choice" that arises from
"putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us" (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971))); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-504 (1984) ("[T]he freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect
of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for
truth and the vitality of society as a whole."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion... is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system." (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931))); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.2 ("Freedom of speech is one of the
preeminent rights of Western democratic theory, the touchstone of individual liberty."). Justice
Brandeis summarized the origins of the First Amendment and its importance to the United
States' democratic underpinnings:
Those who won our independence believed.., that public discussion is a political
duty;, and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government
.... Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (BrandeisJ., concurring).
17. Justice Holmes introduced the marketplace doctrine in Abrams v. United States, arguing.
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe.., that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
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place doctrine suggests that the First Amendment serves as a protector
of democracy by promoting the public discussion of competing ideas
and by increasing the People's participation in society and in their
government.18 Over time, several theories regarding the primary goal
of the First Amendment have been considered, 9 but the Supreme
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (holding that First
Amendment did not protect distribution of pamphlets during war time that criticized President
Wilson's sending of troops to help counter Russian revolution).
The marketplace theory "assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by
governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives
or solutions for societal problems." Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace ofldeas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE LJ. 1, 3 (noting Holmes' belief that properly functioning marketplace of ideas brings
about proper evolution of society, wherever that evolution might lead); see United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[If there is any principle
of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle
of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that
we hate.").
18. See Ingber, supra note 17, at 2-4 (noting that marketplace doctrine, in addition to its
usefulness in search for truth and knowledge, promotes popular participation in society and
government, thereby advancing quality of democratic government). The earliest groundwork
for the marketplace doctrine was established in John Milton's Areopagitica in 1644, in which
Milton espoused the view that freedom of expression enhances the social good, and that
unrestricted debate leads to the discovery of truth. See T. BARTON CARTER Er AL, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 35 (Foundation Press 6th ed. 1994) ("And though all the
winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?'" (quotingJOHN
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918))). In the years between Areopagitica and
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams, philosophers includingJohn Locke andJohn Stuart Mill
advanced Milton's theories, particularly Mill, who insisted that freedom of thought, discussion
and investigation were goods in their own tight, and that, in the end, the open exchange of
ideas benefits society above all else. See id, at 35-37.
19. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.2 (outlining numerous theories regarding
the values that underlie the First Amendment). Many scholars believe that the uncertainty
surrounding Framers' intent with regard to the goals of the First Amendment and the resulting
myriad theories regarding the right to free speech was intentional. SeeLillian R. BeVier, Thefirst
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 299, 307 (1978) (arguing that if history reveals that Framers had no specific meaning in
mind, "it also permits the conclusion that no particular meanings were deliberately foreclosed
... Thus, the Framers may have intended the very vagueness of the text [of the First
Amendment] to delegate to future generations the task of evolving a precise meaning."). In his
seminal exposition on the FirstAmendment, TheSyster ofFreedom ofExpession, Professor Thomas
I. Emerson argued that in lieu of a single, cohesive principle guiding the interpretation of the
First Amendment, a complex system of freedom of expression has emerged. See THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970). Emerson posited that in a
democratic society, the system of freedom of expression is based on four premises:
[1] freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfill-
ment ...
[2] freedom of expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth....
[3] freedom of expression is essential to provide for participation in decision making
by all members of society....
[4] freedom of expression is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a
more stable community.
Id. Justice Holmes' marketplace doctrine, it can be argued, embodies all four of these First
Amendment goals.
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Court has continued to subscribe to models based on justice Holmes'
interpretation." The Court has consistently encouraged an ever-
expanding marketplace of ideas by extending the highest level of First
Amendment protection to virtually every new form of communication
as each has emerged.2
The Court maintains that in order to ensure a free, unfettered
interchange of ideas,22 as Justice Holmes encouraged, the judiciary
must act to prevent the government from interfering with the growth
of the marketplace of ideas. 23 To this end, and because our political
system and cultural life rest upon the ideal that the Government shall
not silence speakers because of the content of their particular
message, 4 the Court insists that any law that regulates speech on the
20. See Ingber, supra note 17, at 2 n.2 (observing that "marketplace of ideas" permeates
Supreme Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence (citing, inter alia, Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 866 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 538 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1975);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,826 (1975); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
248 (1974); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1966))); see also C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the lrst Amendment Freedom of Speecl, 25 UCLA L REV. 964, 968 n.9 (1978)
(noting that Supreme Court "steadfastly relies upon a marketplace of ideas theory in
determiningwhat speech is protected" (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 189 n.25 (1973) (Brennan & Marshall,IJ., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 467 (1972) (RehnquistJ., dissenting); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 398 U.S. 367, 392 n.18
(1969); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272 n.13, 279 n.19; Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 514-15
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 151 n.22 (1959)
(Black & Douglas, JJ., and Warren, CJ., dissenting))).
21. See infra Part LC (discussing manner in which Supreme Court has applied First
Amendment to government regulation of print communications, radio and television broadcast
communications, telephone communications, and cable television communications).
22. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern."); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (stating
that First Amendment "'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people'" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
23. See, eg., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,381-82 (1984) ("'The freedom
of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear
of subsequent punishment.'" (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)));
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745-46 ("[I]t is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas." (citing Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976))); In reSyracuse Peace Council v.
Television Station WTVH, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5056 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order)
("[A] cardinal tenet of the First Amendment is that governmental intervention in the
marketplace of ideas.., is not acceptable and should not be tolerated.").
24. See, eg., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("[E]ach person
should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration,
and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992) ("'The FirstAmendment generallyprevents governmentfrom
proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.'" (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940))); Tribe, supra note 2 (arguing "that, although
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basis of its content is presumptively invalid.'
The right to free speech, however, is not absolute.26 In some forms,
speech can be so harmful or so lacking in redeeming value that the
government has an interest in restricting it. The Court acknowledges,
for instance, that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity,27
child pornography,2 libelous speech, 29 speech that incites "imminent
lawless action,"" or words calculated to provoke a fight." In each of
information and ideas have real effects in the social world, it's not up to government to pick and
choose for us in terms of the content of that information or the value of those ideas," and that
"[t]he real basis for First Amendment values... [is] the belief that information and ideas are
too important to entrust to any government censor or overseer").
25. See RA. V., 505 U.S. at 382 (noting that First Amendment does not permit government
to proscribe speech or conduct because it disapproves of its content); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (allowing restrictions based on "time, place,
or manner," but not content); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.").
26. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)
(noting that the Court has "long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance"); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("[W]e reject the view that
freedom of speech and association... as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
are 'absolutes'"). But see id. at 60-61, 63, 68 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the First
Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing'
that was to be done in this field."). Some constitutional scholars, including Professor Thomas
Emerson, espouse a modified absolutist approach that makes a distinction between the way in
which the First Amendment protects expression and the way in which it protects action. See
EMERSON, supra note 19, at 17 (arguing that central idea of system of freedom of expression is
that "a fundamental distinction must be drawn between conduct which consists of 'expression'
and conduct which consists of 'action'"). Emerson insisted that
"[e]xpression" must be freely allowed and encouraged. "Action" can be controlled,
subject to other constitutional requirements, but not by controlling expression ....
The character of the system is such that freedom of expression can flourish, and the
goals of the system can be realized, only if expression receives full protection under the
First Amendment.
Id.
27. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (holding that obscene speech is not protected by the First
Amendment). The Court later held in Millerv. California that speech is considered obscene, and
thus not protected by the First Amendment, when it (a) appeals to the prurient interest
according to community standards, (b) describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
(c) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973).
28. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (holding that New York statute
prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting sexual performance by child under the age of
16 by distributing child pornography did not violate First Amendment, as long as statute was not
vague or overbroad).
29. See NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that libelous
statements "made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was fhIse or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not," are not protected by First Amendment).
30. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (finding statute criminalizing mere
advocacy of use of force, here by Ku Klux Klan, unconstitutional as violation of free speech and
assembly). The Court held that while the First Amendment does protect speech merely
advocating the use of force, it does not protect speech that incites or produces "imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447. The test enunciated
in BrandenburgrefinedJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes' "clear and present danger" test. See i.
at 450-59 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Schendk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justice
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these instances, the Court reasons that the right to free speech is
outweighed by a substantial governmental interest.
B. Judicial Doctrines Safeguarding the Right to Free Speech
Even when the Constitution permits the government to regulate
types of speech such as these, the Court recognizes the need to limit
the restrictions so that protected speech is not simultaneously
impinged. Because freedom of speech is so "delicate and vulnerable,"
and "supremely precious in our society," 2 the Court applies the
intertwining doctrines of overbreadth, void-for-vagueness, and strict
scrutiny to circumscribe the government's ability to restrict speech,
and to safeguard the democratic freedoms at the heart of the First
Amendment.
One of the primary judicial tools used to prevent unconstitutional
restrictions of free speech, the doctrine of overbreadth, requires that
restrictions on speech be drafted very carefully, so as not to infringe
upon a protected freedom while accomplishing a permissible end.33
Reviewing otherwise legitimate laws passed by Congress, the Court
strikes down any curtailment of speech that is so overbroad that it
infringes upon protected speech and thereby chils individuals' First
Amendment rights.' In determining whether a statute is overbroad,
the Court evaluates whether the statute is so sweeping that it would
deter persons from engaging in protected speech, or whether it is so
Holmes reasoned that the speech of a man who falsely shouts "fire" in a theater, causing a panic,
would not be protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 52 (observing that character of
speech depends upon circumstances in which it was uttered, and ruling that First Amendment
does not protect speech that creates a "clear and present danger").
31. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that New
Hampshire statute banning "words likely to cause an average addressee to fight" did not violate
First Amendment).
32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
33. See, eg., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (concluding that ban on
distribution of material that might be unsuitable for minors was unconstitutional because it
"reduce[d] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children ....
Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig."); Cantwel v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940) ("In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."); CARTFR Er AL, supra note 18, at
67-68 (noting that when determining constitutionality of restraints on freedom of speech,
Supreme Court most frequently uses balancing test that weighs government's concern about
protecting particular interest-national security, innocence of children, etc.-against individual's
and society's interests in free expression).
34. A statute that does not directly impinge on the protected speech of a specific person
is still unconstitutional if it is so broad as to indirectly dissuade that person from engaging in
otherwise protected speech. See Button, 371 U.S. at 432 (arguing that law in question could be
invalid if it prohibited free speech, regardless of "whether or not the record discloses that the
petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct. For in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon
such rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute
in other factual contexts besides that at bar.").
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far-reaching that it could be used arbitrarily by law enforcement
officials against political dissenters.3 5
In securing the protections of the First Amendment, the Court also
strikes down statutes regulating speech if they are void-fqr-vague-
ness.3 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that all crimihal laws
provide fair notice to persons before making their activity criminal."7
This doctrine is enforced with particular vigor when a First Amend-
ment right, including the right to free speech, is regulated."8 When
the content of speech is regulated by executive or legislative action,
there is a heightened fear that a law that does not draw bright lines
might regulate or appear to regulate more than is necessary, and thus
deter persons from engaging in protected speech. 9
In conjunction with the protections that the overbreadth and void-
for-vagueness doctrines offer in checking the regulation of free
speech, the doctrine of strict scrutiny also serves to ensure that a
statute does not infringe upon protected speech.4" Because freedom
of speech is considered to be in a constitutionally "preferred
position, "41 any legislation that might infringe upon it must use
means that are the least restrictive of free speech, even when the
legislative purpose is legitimate and when there is a substantial
government interest.42 In short, the government may not pursue its
35. See Gooding v. Wilson, 444 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (submitting that "persons whose
expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression");
Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (noting "danger of tolerating, in the area of FirstAmendment freedoms,
the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application"). See generally
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.8 (summarizing overbreadth doctrine).
36. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.9 (noting that vagueness doctrine and
overbreadth doctrines, which are applied to statutes regulating speech for identical reasons, are
often spoken of together by Supreme Court).
37. See id. (suggesting that if law is vague, lack of notice in the law might deter exercise of
constitutional rights).
38. See id. (indicating need to place persons on notice as to precisely what activity is made
criminal when fundamental constitutional right, such as free speech, is affected).
39. See Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (explaining that because freedom of speech is "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society ... [tihe threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions").
40. See ia ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,311 (1940))); see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (observing that government may regulate content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote compelling interest only if it uses least restrictive means
to further articulated interest).
41. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (stating that freedom of press,
freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are "in a preferred position").
42. See SabI4 492 U.S. at 126 (reasoning that to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
government achieves legitimate interest only by "'narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve
those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms'" (quoting
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980))).
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interests, even if legitimate and substantial, by means that broadly
stifle free speech if the same end can be achieved by more narrow
means.
43
The Court thus recognizes that an absolute right to free speech is
more of a utopian ideal than a practical reality.' The Court
acknowledges the fact that speech may lose its preferred status and be
infringed, but only in those rare instances where the government is
pursuing a substantial interest that outweighs the public's interest in
an unfettered marketplace of ideas.' Acknowledging the First
Amendment's crucial role as the cornerstone of democracy, the Court
employs the overlapping doctrines of overbreadth, vagueness, and
strict scrutiny to make it difficult for the government to regulate a
constitutional right so precious in American society.46 These doctrines
are particularly relevant when determining the constitutionality of the
regulation of speech in various forms of mass communication.
C. Government Regulation of Existing Mass Mediums
1. Medium-specific analysis
The Supreme Court has long held that as new forms of media are
introduced, new First Amendment standards must be applied to each
if there are differences in the characteristics of each new form.47 In
an attempt to keep the First Amendment up to date with technology,
the Court established different sets of rules, using a medium-by-
medium approach, when determining the level of First Amendment
protection that should be afforded to print,' broadcast radio and
43. See id. ("It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling, the means
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.").
44. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining that right to freedom of speech
is not viewed as absolute).
45. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (describing types of speech not protected
by First Amendment).
46. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that statutes
regulating First Amendment behavior be narrow and unambiguous, and discussing standard of
review court will give such statutes).
47. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496
(1986) (Blackmun,J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated differently for
First Amendment purposes."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("We have long
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment Problems.");
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurring) ("The moving picture screen,
the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have
differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself. ").
48. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing level of constitutional protection
afforded to print communications); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (granting print communications highest level of First Amendment protection and
holding that because selection of newspaper content is function of editorial control,judgment,
and decision, statutes that attempt to interfere with or regulate this control are inconsistent with
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television, 49 telephone communications, 0 and cable television 5 as
each emerged onto the communications landscape.
This "medium-specific" approach to the regulation of mass
communications considers each medium separately and applies a
balancing approach of competing government interests to each form
in a slightly different manner.52 The Court therefore examines the
underlying technology and unique characteristics of each new form
of communication before determining whether there is a governmen-
tal interest which might outweigh the First Amendment interest in
unrestrained speech over that particular medium.5"
Speech conveyed through the print medium has historically enjoyed
the highest level of constitutional First Amendment protection.54 The
Court has consistently spoken forcefully on the critical role the print
medium plays in advancing a robust national debate.5 Since the First
right to free press guaranteed in First Amendment).
49. See infta notes 57-75 and accompanying text (discussing level of constitutional protection
afforded to broadcast communications); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 366-91
(1969) (granting qualified level of First Amendment protection to broadcast communications
and finding that government's role in allocating limited broadcast frequencies and insuring that
broadcasters' programming ranges are sufficient to meet public interest was constitutional).
50. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing level of constitutional protection
afforded to telephone communications); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 117 (1989) (granting telephone communications highest level of constitutional protection
and holding that First Amendment protects indecent, though not obscene, speech in
commercial telephone messages).
51. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text (discussing level of constitutional
protection afforded to cable communications); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
636-38 (1994) (affording heightened level of First Amendment protection to cable communica-
tions and noting that "application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion
and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable
regulation" (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983))).
52. See Fred H. Cate, The Fort Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 1, 3 (1995) (noting that "the same restriction on the same words would be
analyzed differently under the First Amendment, depending on whether those words were
uttered on a street corner, printed in a newspaper, transmitted through a telegraph wire,
broadcast on the radio, or spoken into the telephone").
53. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 (stating that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them").
54. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1973) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that there is "virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the
print media"); LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrtnrONAL LAW § 12-25 (2d ed. 1988)
(pointing out that "[t] he First Amendment guarantee of freedom from government intrusion
reigns most confidently in the realm of the print media, since newspapers and pamphlets were
the most significant modes of mass communication in the world of the Framers").
55. SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,34 (1973) ("'The protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.'" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957))); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392 n.18 (noting importance of encouraging expression of views
opposing those of broadcasters (citing JOHN MIL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947)));
New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this case against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .. "); see also Owen Fiss, In Search of a New
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Amendment's inception, the Court has continually forbidden
governmental regulation of content, however minimal, in books,
newspapers, and other forms of print media. 6 As newer forms of
communication have emerged over time, however, the Court has not
been as willing to extend such a high level of constitutional protec-
tion.
2. Regulation of radio and television broadcasts
Much like the Internet today, the emergence of radio and television
broadcasting earlier this century brought a new technology into the
world of mass media, and with it new challenges of regulating within
the boundaries of the First Amendment. In the seminal case of FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation,"' the Court drew new boundaries by establishing
how far the government may go in restricting free speech over
broadcast television and radio.5"
The Court in Pacifica considered whether the afternoon radio
broadcast of a twelve-minute George Carlin monologue containing a
litany of off-color and vulgar words violated a federal statute prohibit-
ing the broadcasting of obscene, indecent, and profane material. 9
The Court was faced with making a distinction between obscene and
indecent speech,' and with making a determination of whether the
broadcast medium should receive the same high level of First
Amendment protection as that afforded print media.
6'
In its case against Pacifica, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") argued that broadcast media should receive a reduced
level of constitutional protection.62 The FCC argued that "indecent"
Paradigm, 104 YALE LJ. 1613, 1617 (1995) (arguing that essence of First Amendment is
protecting and supporting public debate of important social issues).
56. See Miami Herald Publ'g, 418 U.S. at 258 (declaring unconstitutional statute granting
individual attacked by newspaper right to have response printed in that newspaper); New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 292 (overturning holding that editorial advertisement published in NewYork
Times reciting grievances, protesting claimed abuses, and seeking financial support on behalf
of African American suffrage was libelous).
57. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
58. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978) (determining primarily whether
FCC has power to regulate radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene).
59. See id. at 729-30; 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (forbidding use of"any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communications"). Carlin's satirical monologue, entitled
"Filthy Words," prompted a man who heard the material while driving with his young son to
write a letter complaining to the FCC. See Padfica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
60. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-42 (analyzing statute's legislative history and Court's relevant
jurisprudence and outlining distinctions between obscenity and indecency).
61. See id. at 748 (recognizing that each medium of expression prompts different First
Amendment analyses, and that broadcasting traditionally receives level of protection lower than
any other medium).
62. See id. at 730-31 (discussing FCC memorandum opinion regarding Carlin's broadcast
outlining reasons why Commission believes that broadcast communications should receive lower
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material, a type of expression less offensive than obscene material but
still patently offensive, should not be considered protected speech
when broadcast on a television or over the radio.'3 Prior to Pacifica,
the Court had defined the concept of indecency to be co-extensive
with obscenity.' Thus, the standard for determining indecency prior
to Pacifica was the same as that for determining obscenity: whether
the material, taken as a whole, is patently offensive, appeals to an
average person's prurient interest, and is without serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value when considered in connection
with contemporary community standards.65
In Pacifica, however, the Court diluted the First Amendment
protection accorded to radio and television broadcasts by drawing a
distinction between obscene speech and indecent speech.66 The
Court concluded that the FCC law in question prohibited the
broadcast not only of "obscene" speech, but also of the less harmful
"indecent" speech.67 The Court held that the broadcast of indecent
material during times when children are presumed to be in the
audience is punishable, even if the material is not obscene in the
constitutional sense.' Thus, the Supreme Court afforded the
medium of radio and television broadcasting a lower level of First
Amendment protection than any other form of mass communication
previously considered.69
level of First Amendment protection).
63. See id. at 731-32 (discussing FCC memorandum opinion and contention that Carlin's
broadcast, although not obscene, was patently offensive, and therefore fell under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464's prohibition of indecent speech over broadcast airwaves).
64. See TamE, supra note 54, § 12-18 (noting that lack of precise definition of "indecency"
led the Court to construe term to mean no more than "obscene"); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC,
and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 585 (1975).
65. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Court later held the ban on
obscenity, and the application of the Millerstandard to broadcasting, constitutional. See Illinois
Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that determination
of obscenity and indecency of broadcast does not unconstitutionally infringe upon public's
rights).
66. See Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 738-41 (considering and rejecting Pacifica's argument that
legislature intended "obscenity" and "indecency" to mean same thing and that statute only
banned material which fifled Mi!ler test). The Court argued that when Congress included the
phrase, "obscene, indecent, or profane," in the plain wording of the statute, they intended for
all three of the words to be construed independently. See id. at 739-40 (noting that phrase is
written in the disjunctive, implying that each word has a separate meaning).
67. See id. at 739-41 (holding that element of"prurient appeal" is not essential component
of indecent language, and that speech can still be regulated as "indecent" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 if it is "patently offensive" and either "sexual" or "excretory").
68. The Court argued that although the monologue was only indecent, and not obscene,
it could still be banned because of the "uniquely pervasive presence [of broadcast media] in the
lives of all Americans" and because "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those
too young to read." Id. at 748-49.
69. The Court acknowledged and upheld the rule that broadcast communication
traditionally receives a lower level of First Amendment protection. See id. at 748 ("(O]f all forms
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In Pacifica, the Court made clear that the reason for this lower
standard of constitutional protection was tied directly to the nature
and characteristics of the broadcast medium that set it apart from
print communications."0 The Court observed that broadcast commu-
nication differs from print communication in two distinct ways: its
pervasiveness and its ease of access to children.7 The Court reasoned
that because television and radio broadcasting has a "uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,"72 and because
broadcasting "is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young
to read,"7" the Government may regulate broadcasting in ways that
would run afoul of the First Amendment if they were applied to the
print medium.74 Considering these unique characteristics and the
medium's underlying technology, the Court thus held that indecent
speech, in addition to obscene speech, was not protected by the First
Amendment when broadcast on the television or over the radio.75
3. Regulation of telephone communications
When the Court was faced with determining the constitutionality of
a statute regulating telephone communications, it was not as willing
to deny First Amendment protection to "indecent" speech. In Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,7" the Court invalidated an
FCC ban on indecent commercial telephone messages, holding that
the transmission of indecent material over the telephone may be
proscribed only if the government chooses the least restrictive means
of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.").
70. See id. at 74849 (pointing out the broadcast media's pervasiveness and accessibility to
children).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 748 (remarking that the result of pervasiveness is that "[p]atently offensive,
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also
in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder").
73. See id at 749 (arguing that while dirty words in magazine or book would be incompre-
hensible to first grader, those same words would be instantly comprehended by child and
incorporated into his or her vocabulary if broadcast on television or over radio).
74. See id at 748 (comparing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which
forbids government from forcing newspaper to print replies of those whom they criticize, with
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which forces broadcasters to give free
time to victims of their criticism).
75. See id. at 750-51. Playing off of Justice Sutherland's "pig in the parlor" analogy, the
Court held that "when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of
its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.... (A] 'nuisance may
be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.'"
Id (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
76. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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of limiting such speech." Considering the unique characteristics of
telephone communications, the Court held that the telephone
medium required a greater degree of First Amendment protection
than that given to broadcast communications.
78
The Court in Sable expressly distinguished Pacifica as "an emphati-
cally narrow holding" that relied upon the "'unique' attributes of
broadcasting."79 The Court noted that telephone communications
are not as pervasive as radio and television broadcasts and that they
are not as accessible to children." The Court emphasized that unlike
broadcast transmissions, telephone communications do not bombard
a "captive audience" with unwanted, indecent material; the telephone
medium is less accessible, "requir[ing] the listener to take affirmative
steps to receive the communication."81 The Court found that the
characteristics specific to the broadcast medium which justified a
limited application of First Amendment protection simply are not
present in the context of telephone communications.
8 2
The Court in Sable further pointed out that the statute banning
obscene and indecent dial-a-porn8 3 was overbroad and thus did not
pass strict scrutiny analysis.' The Court urged that while Congress
may constitutionally impose an outright ban on "obscene" dial-a-porn
messages, it may not regulate "indecent" dial-a-porn messages without
77. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (holding that
ban could not survive constitutional scrutiny because "the statute's denial of adult access to
telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to
limit the access of minors to such messages"). The disputed statute, section 223(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1988, imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent
as well as obscene commercial telephone messages. See 47 .U.S.C. § 223(b) (1994).
78. See Sabl, 492 U.S. at 127 (noting that unique attributes of broadcasting, and fact that
ban in Pacifwa was total while here it was only partial, justify granting lower level of protection
to broadcasting than that to telephone communications).
79. Id
80. See id. at 127-28 (arguing that private commercial telephone communications at issue
in Sabe were substantially different from public radio broadcast at issue in Pacifica).
81. Id at 128; see id. at 127-28 (observing that unexpected outbursts on radio broadcasts are
unlike messages received by persons using dial-a-porn, in that latter is not so invasive or
surprising that unwilling listeners will be exposed to it).
82. See Sab/k 492 U.S. at 126 (distinguishing Pacifica from case at hand and reiterating rule
that government "may not 'reduce the adult population ... to only what is fit for children'"
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983))).
83. The court described dial-a-porn, the type of communication atissue in Sabe as "sexually
oriented prerecorded telephone messages." Id. at 117-18.
84. See id. at 131 (arguing that statute was not narrowly tailored, and that ban was thus
unconstitutional, even though it might serve compelling government interest of preventing
minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages). "Because the statute's denial of
adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which
is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages, we hold that the ban does not survive
constitutional scrutiny." Id.
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considering the age of those receiving the messages.85 The Court
acknowledged that although the Government has a compelling
interest in protecting minors, 6 Congress failed to narrowly tailor the
statute to achieve that purpose, resulting in an overbroad statute."7
Thus, because the telephone communications medium does not share
those characteristics unique to broadcast communication s and
because the statute in question was overbroad and failed strict scrutiny
analysis, 9 speech transmitted over the medium enjoys heightened
constitutional protection akin to that applied to print communica-
tions.
4. Regulation of cable television
When the Court was faced with the specter of regulating yet
another new form of communication, cable television, it again
employed a medium-specific analysis, reiterating its intent to apply
different standards of First Amendment protection to new forms of
communication based on their unique characteristics. ° With regard
to cable television, the Court was faced with determining whether the
new form of communication was more akin to print communica-
tions,9 which would allow it broad First Amendment protection, or
85. See id. at 126 (noting that sexual expression which is indecent, but not obscene, is
protected by the First Amendment). Unlike obscenity, which receives no First Amendment
protection regardless of the age of its audience, indecency is protected speech which can be
subjected to content-based regulation only to promote compelling interests in the least
restrictive way. See id at 124-26. This is the strict-scrutiny test for content-based speech
regulation.
86. See i. at 126 ("We have recognized that there is a compelling [government] interest
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.").
87. See id. at 128 (asserting that Congress did not choose least restrictive means of
regulation, given that use of credit cards, access codes, or scrambling rules, as formulated by
FCC, would keep indecent dial-a-porn out of reach of minors).
88. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing level of First Amendment
protection as function of communications technology at issue).
89. Seesupra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing application ofstrictscrutiny test
to facts of Sabke and Court's reasoning as to why dial-a-porn statute was unconstitutional).
90. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,494-95 (1986)
(indirectly reaffirming, in context of cable right-of-way dispute, support for different standards
for different media but not deciding specific standard for cable television, which Court saw as
roughly analogous both to newspapers and wireless broadcasters); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,
768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (-'[Each medium of expression must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.'"
(quoting Southeaster Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975))).
91. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing traditionally broad scope of
First Amendment protection for print media).
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more like regular television and radio broadcast communications, 92
which would result in relatively narrow First Amendment protec-
tion.93
Although the Supreme Court has not yet set forth a clear, unequiv-
ocal standard signifying the level of First Amendment protection
afforded cable communications,94 federal courts consistently have held
that cable deserves a level of protection greater than that granted to
broadcast communications.95 When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia examined the unique characteristics of cable
communications, particularly the absence of the problems of
pervasiveness and accessibility to children, the court determined that
cable communications were more akin to print communications than
to broadcast communications.
96
92. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text (discussing Pacifica case and application
of lower standard of constitutional review to regulation of broadcast media).
93. SeePreferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (stating that
when considering application of First Amendment to cable communications, "the Court must
determine whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to
another medium to warrant application of an already existing standard or whether those
characteristics require anew analysis"); Claudine Langan, Cyberpom: .. .A New LegalBog (visited
Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.public.asu.edu/-langcl/history2.hnl>.
94. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over appropriate level
of scrutiny expressed in Supreme Court's latest treatment of content-based regulations of cable
communications).
95. Most courts considering the issue have found that speech carried via cable is entitled
to a greater degree of First Amendment protection than speech which is broadcast because the
reasons underlying regulation ofbroadcast content (physical scarcity, intrusiveness of broadcast)
do not support regulation of cable programming. See, ag., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (stating that rationales for lessened First Amendment protection in
broadcast context do not apply to cable context); Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 768 F.2d at 1450
("[B]eyond the obvious parallel that both cable and broadcast television impinge on the senses
via a video receiver, the two media differ in constitutionally significant ways. In light of cable's
virtually unlimited channel capacity, the standard of First Amendment review reserved for
occupants of the physically scarce airwaves is plainly inapplicable."); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415,
1419-22 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that Pacifca, which enforced lower level of scrutiny for
broadcast speech, was inapplicable to "cablevision" because cable is less intrusive than broadcast,
requiring affirmative steps by subscriber and providing advance notice of programming content,
and because interest of preventing access by children "is significantly weaker in the context of
cable television because parental manageability of cable television greatly exceeds the ability to
manage the broadcast media"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45-46 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (stating that rationales developed in broadcast context cannot be "directly applied" to
cable television because physical scarcity rationale is not present). Furthermore, theoretical
allegations of "economic scarcity" cannot justify lower standard of First Amendment protection
for cable, since economic scarcity can be said to exist in print as well but is "insufficient tojustify
even limited government intrusion into the FirstAmendment rights of the conventional press");
Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1115 (D. Utah 1985)
("[T]he distinctions between Pacfwa and the present case are manifest .... The differences
between radio and cable make Pacifica [and its lower level of review for broadcast regulations]
easily distinguishable."), affid sub nOn. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
480 U.S. 926 (1987).
96. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 768 F.2d at 1450 ("[O]nce one has cleared the conceptual
hurdle of recognizing that all forms of television need not be treated as a generic unity for
purposes of the First Amendment, the analogy to more traditional media [print] is compel-
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,97 the Supreme Court
similarly found that cable communications deserve a greater level of
First Amendment protection than that afforded to broadcast
communications." The Court again cited the fundamental techno-
logical differences between cable and broadcast communications as
the primary reason for applying a different level of scrutiny to
content-based regulations of speech.9 Thus, the Court acknowledged,
the cable medium should be granted constitutional protection
nearing or equaling that of print media.1"
ling."); Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 46 (noting that there is no "constitutional distinction
between cable television and newspapers" with regard to the unwanted intrusions into First
Amendment rights).
97. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
98. SeeTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-41 (1994). The Court noted that
with regard to government regulations affecting the content of speech on cable, "the rationale
for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation,
whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable
regulation." Id. at 622. Note that the Court in Turner did not directly address the issue of
government regulation of content on cable; the Court was reviewing content-neutral "must
carry" regulations, contained in sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992 ("CTCPCA"), Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1994)). These provisions required cable operators to carry
the signals of a certain number of local broadcast television stations. See id. at 636. The Court
held that an intermediate level of scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, should apply to such content-
neutral restrictions that impose only an incidental burden on speech. See id at 661-62. When
the Supreme Court reheard the Turner case two years later, intermediate scrutiny again was
applied to the content-neutral must carry regulations. SeeTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117
S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (reaffirming constitutionality of must carry regulations). This Comment,
including the analysis of the CDA and speech limitations placed upon other forms communica-
tion, is concerned primarily with government regulation affecting the content of speech.
99. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 639 ("In light of these fundamental technological differences
between broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny
... is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation."). The Court's
primary focus was not on the pervasiveness or availability-to-children characteristics unique to
broadcasting, as the focus had been in Pac/flca and Sable. The Court argued that the largest
distinction between broadcast communications and cable communications was that of spectrum
scarcity. See id. at 637-39 (finding that cable communications do not suffer from spectrum
scarcity as do broadcast communications). The spectrum scarcity rationale holds that because
there is a limited number of broadcast frequencies, and because broadcast frequencies are
considered scarce public resources, the government has an interest in regulating the use of
those resources through grants of broadcast licenses in the public interest. Furthermore,
without such governmental rationing, the right of any individual to broadcast would be
meaningless because competing signals would crowd them out. See id. at 637 ("[T]here are
more would-be broadcasters than frequencies available in the electromagnetic spectrum. And
if two broadcasters were to attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same locale, they
would interfere with one another's signals, so that neither could be heard at all."); Wilkinson,
611 F. Supp. at 1112 (recognizing that "'[t] here is a fixed natural limitation upon the number
of stations that can operate without interfering with each other,'" and that chaos would result
if government did not ration broadcast frequencies (quoting National Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943))).
100. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 639 (observing that "settled principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence," rather than more lax standard of review developed in cases involving broadcast
medium, should govern cable cases); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (plurality opinion) (characterizing standard of review in
Turner as "heightened scrutiny"); id. at 2419-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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In Turner, the Court continued its use of a medium-specific analysis
by once again determining the appropriate level of First Amendment
protection according to the unique characteristics of the communica-
tions medium.'' From print, to broadcast, to telephone communica-
tions, to cable, the Court found little need to deviate from its strong
protection of the First Amendment right to free speech. 2 Only when
in part) (noting that Court's First Amendment distinctions between media have placed cable
in a "doctrinal wasteland" in which cable industry could not be certain whether it was entitled
to the high level of protection afforded print media, "or was subject to the more onerous
obligations shouldered by the broadcast media .... Over time, ... we have drawn closer to
recognizing that cable operators should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as the
nonbroadcast media.") (citations omitted).
In its most recent review of regulations affecting speech on cable communications, however,
the Supreme Court signaled that it might be willing to apply a level of review lower than strict
scrutiny to content-based regulations. In DenverArea Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, which involved a challenge to FCC orders implementing the indecent and obscene
programming provisions of the CTCPCA, the Court refused to expressly apply strict scrutiny in
the cable communications context. 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (plurality opinion). In Denver
Area, the Court struck down, on First Amendment grounds, sections 10(b) and (c) of the
GrCPCA, which inter alia, permitted operators of "public" access cable TV channels to prohibit
patently offensive or indecent programming. The Court upheld, however, section 10(a),
permitting cable operators to prohibit such programming on "leased" access channels. See id.
at 2387-88.
The Court stated that the "segregate and block" mechanism of section 10(b) would "fail [J
to satisfy this Court's formulations of the First Amendment's 'strictest,' as well as its somewhat
less 'strict,' requirements." Id. at 2391 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2404,2406-07 (Kennedy
& Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
("The plurality cannot bring itself to apply strict scrutiny .... ."). The Court noted that, like
broadcast television and radio, cable television has become "uniquely pervasive" in homes, is
highly accessible to children, and confronts a captive audience with patently offensive material
"with little or no prior warning." Id. at 2374, 2386-87 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 2404,
2406 (Kennedy & Ginsburg, .1., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (arguing that when the Court is confronted with a threat to free speech in
the context of an emerging technology, it "ought to have discipline to analyze the case by
reference to existing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.... The creation of
standards and adherence to them, even when it means affording protection to speech unpopular
or distasteful, is the central achievement of our First Amendmentjurisprudence."). Kennedy
and Ginsburg concluded that"at a minimum, the proper standard for reviewing [content based
regulations of cable communications] is strict scrutiny." Id. at 2416 (Kennedy & Ginsburg, iJ.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Because the court expressly declined to adopt a definitive standard for evaluating content-
based regulation in the cable medium, see id. at 2385, because the decision was so splintered (six
opinions were issued, none of which garnered a majority), and because only a plurality of the
Court held that something less than strict scrutiny was warranted, it is uncertain what affect the
Denver Area opinion will have on future reviews of content-based cable regulation.
[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies ... allows us to declare a rigid
single standard, good for now and for all future media purposes .... (A]ware as we
are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure,
related to telecommunications... we believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to
pick one analogy or one specific set of words now.
Id. at 2385 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
101. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing functional relationship
between various communications media and Court's First Amendment jurisprudence).
102. See supra notes 54-100 and accompanying text (cataloging development of Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence with respect to emerging technologies).
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considering the regulation of radio and television broadcasts did the
Court carve out an exception to this high level of protection. 3 Only
with broadcast communications did the Court find that the unique
characteristics of the medium, namely pervasiveness and accessibility
to children, justified granting a lower level of protection which would
allow the government to regulate speech deemed "indecent" by
Congress and the FCC."°
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON THE INTERNET AND THE CDA
Today, the public and government are hailing the Internet as the
mode of communication for the twenty-first century.0 Along with
the grand aspirations and expectations surrounding the medium,
however, a critical issue has emerged: how, if at all, the government
should regulate the Internet 0 6 Many credit the present success of
the medium to its decentralized, egalitarian nature;1 7 one of its
103. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text (discussing Pacfica's relaxed standard of
First Amendment review for broadcast media).
104. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (explaining significance of broadcast's
pervasiveness and accessibility to children in Pac/fic decision). But see Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at
2385-86 (plurality opinion) (upholding section 10(a) of CTCPCA, which permits cable operators
to block indecent programming on leased access channels, in part because of importance of
interest in protecting children from indecency and similarity of problem and solution to
Padfica).
105. See Robinson, supra note 4, at C7 (arguing that because Internet combines the best
attributes of all forms of media and because it fulfills the goals of the First Amendment like no
other medium, Internet is a "herald of the information age" and the twenty-first century). FCC
Commissioner Rachelle B. Chong, describing the new Information Age, paints a picture of a
world in which information is a globally traded, premium commodity, and where the Internet
will allow instant, inexpensive access to that information. See Rachelle B. Chong, The First
Amendment in an Information Age, Remarks Before the National Asian Pacific Bar Association,
1996 NAPBA National Conference, available in 1996 WL 669221, at *4-6 (Nov. 15, 1996)
(pointing out that "Information Superhighway is already changing how we do business, where
we live, how we learn, and how we receive health care"). Echoing Ms. Chong's enthusiasm
regarding the Internet's economic and social potential, the Clinton Administration issued a
White Paper days after the Supreme Court's decision in Rno v. ACLU that described the
Internet as a medium of communication that "empowers citizens and democratizes societies."
CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 1. The White Paper extolled the emergence of the Internet,
stating:
Once a tool reserved for scientific and academic exchange, the Internet has emerged
as an appliance of every day life, accessible from almost every point on the planet.
Students across the world are discovering vast treasure troves of data via the World
Wide Web. Doctors are utilizing tele-medicine to administer off-site diagnoses to
patients in need. Citizens of many nations are finding additional outlets for personal
and political expression. The Internet is being used to reinvent government and
reshape our lives and our communities in the process.
Id at 1.
106. See Chong, supra note 105, at *7 (questioning proper role of government in regulating
content transmitted over broadcast stations, cable television, and "the new medium for the
nineties-the Internet").
107. See 141 CONG. REc. S8330 (daily ecLJune 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[The
Internet] has grown as well as it has, as remarkably as it has, primarily because it has not had
a whole lot of people restricting it, regulating it, and touching it and saying, do not do that or
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greatest virtues is that it is owned by no one, operated by no one, and
regulated by no one." Yet with the passage of the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") and its signing into law by President Clinton on
February 8, 1996, the first regulations specifically tailored to the
Internet1 threatened to end what once was a wild and untamed
cyber-frontier.
110
do this or the other thing."). The Clinton Administration also observed the effect that minimal
government regulation has had on the Internet, noting that "[pirivate sector leadership
accounts for the explosive growth of the Internet today, and the success of electronic commerce
will depend on continued private sector leadership." CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 30
(suggesting that government take a hands-off approach to Internet by promoting self-
regulation). Recognizing the Internet as the first truly "mass medium," a Human Rights Watch
report points out that "[wihile few individuals and groups can publish books or newspapers,
make a film, or produce a radio or television program, any person with a personal computer
and a modem can communicate with a huge international audience." Karen Sorensen, Silencing
the Net: The Threat to Freedom of Expression On-line, 8 Human Rights Watch 2 (May 1996) <go-
pher-.//gopher.igc.apc.org-.5000/00/int/hrw/expression/7>. The report further argues that the
implications of a globally unrestrained Internet for the advancement of democracy are vast. See
it. (observing that the Internet has already shown the potential to "permit individuals with
common interests to organize themselves in forums to debate public policy issues; provide
instant access to a wide range of government affairs; increase citizen oversight of government
affairs; decentralize political decision making;, [and] empower users to become active producers
of information rather than passive consumers").
108. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997) ("No single entity-academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit-administers the
Internet. ... There is no centralized storage location, control point, or communications
channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to control
all of the information conveyed on the Internet."); CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 5 (noting
that "[t]he genius and explosive success of the Internet can be attributed in part to its
decentralized nature and to its tradition of bottom-up governance"); Flumenbaum & Karp, The
Communications Decency Act and the Internet, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 28, 1996, at 3 (describing Internet as
"a series of linked, overlapping, independently controlled computer networks" and stating that
"[n~o one entity or group can control content on the Internet, and none can limit access to
publicly posted material").
109. See President's Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. DOG. 215, 216 (Feb. 8, 1996) ("Today our world is being remade ... by an
information revolution .... But this revolution has been held back by outdated laws designed
for a time when there was one phone company, three TV networks, no such thing as a personal
computer. Today, with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with the future.").
110. See Harvey A. Silvergate, Cyber Speech at Risk, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 4, 1996, at A19 (declaring
that with passage of CDA, "[o]vernight the federal government transformed the newest and
freest medium of communication into the most heavily censored," in that the CDA sought to
ban not only obscene speech, which receives no protection in even the print media, but also to
ban speech which is merely indecent, taking no account of redeeming values of speech). But
see Robert W. Peters, There Is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 363 (1997) (asserting the need for regulations on speech such as CDA because while
Internet has vast potential for good, "if untamed, it also has potential for great harm");JayAlan
Sekulow &James Matthew Henderson, Sr., Unsafe at Any [Modem] Speed. Indecent Communications
Wa Computer and the Communications Deceny Act of 1996, 1 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 <http://
journallaw.ufl.edu/-techlaw/1/sekulow.html> (1996) (arguing thatnational problem of indecent
images and messages on the Internet necessitates government regulation such as CDA, which
is "an essential tool, and a constitutional one").
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A. Use of Existing Laws to Regulate the Internet Pre-CDA
During congressional hearings on the CDA, many legislators voiced
the opinion that the Internet should remain an open frontier, and
that existing laws were sufficient to combat any illegal activities
committed via the Internet."' Even the Department of Justice, when
asked to opine on the subject of new regulations, agreed that the laws
already in place were adequate. 12 In fact, both prior to and since the
enactment of the CDA, the government has prosecuted numerous
federal crimes involving the Internet, including obscenity,13 child
pornography,"4 and stalking," 5 without the use of the CDA.
Federal courts, for instance, have had little trouble convicting
violators of existing obscenity and child pornography laws who use the
Internet in connection with their crimes. In United States v. Thom-
as,"' the Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction of a husband and wife
team who operated a computer bulletin board service" 7 that
distributed obscenity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1456.11' Using this
111. See 141 CONG. REC. S8341 (daily ed.June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[O]ur
criminal laws already prohibit the sale or distribution over computer networks of obscene or
filthy material-18 U.S.C. §§ 1465, 1466,2252 and 2433(a) ... [and] the solicitation of minors
over computers for sexual activity-18 U.S.C. § 2252 - and illegal luring of minors into sexual
activity through computer conversations-18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).").
112. See 141 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (letter to Senator Patrick Leahy
from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Legislative Affairs, May 3, 1995, stating: "[W]e have applied current law to this emerging
problem .... The Department's Criminal Division has, indeed, successfully prosecuted
violations of federal child pornography and obscenity laws which were perpetrated with
computer technology.").
113. See, &g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction of
operators of computer bulletin board service for distributing obscenity under 18 U.S.C. § 1465);
United States v. Maxwell, 42 MJ. 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding conviction for on-
line distribution of obscenity under 18 U.S.C. § 1465), cited in Thomas, 74 F.3d at 708; see also
infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas case and 18 U.S.C. § 1465).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Ownby, 926 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Va. 1996) (memoranda
opinion) (upholding conviction for trading child pornography over the Internet in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)); infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussing use of existing law
in convicting distributors of child pornography over the Internet).
115. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (granting motion to
quash indictment accusing defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. 875(c) by transmitting threats via
Internet e-mail to injure or kidnap). While the court did not convict the defendant, it
acknowledged the application of 18 U.S.C. 875(c) to the Internet. See id. at 1390 ("While new
technology such as the Internet may complicate analysis and may sometimes require new or
modified laws, it does not in this instance qualitatively change the analysis under the statute or
under the First Amendment.").
116. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
117. The court described a computer bulletin board service ("BBS") as a system that is
operated "by using telephones, modems, and personal computers" to offer "e-mail, chat lines,
public messages, and files that members [can] access, transfer, and download to their own
computers and printers." United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1996).
118. The statute reads in pertinent part:
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statute and the test for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California, 9 the
Court determined that the couple was guilty of transmitting obscenity
through interstate phone lines via their members-only computer
bulletin board system. 2 '
Other courts similarly found existing laws sufficient to convict those
guilty of distributing child pornography over the Internet. In United
States v. Ownby,"' the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia upheld the conviction of a man for engaging in
conduct involving the sexual exploitation of minors in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252.122 After being discovered through an FBI investiga-
tion into the trading of child pornography on the computer bulletin
board services of America On-Line, 123 Ownby pled guilty to receiv-
ing,124 transporting,12 and possessingl2l images of child pornogra-
phy.127  Again, despite the lack of statutes specifically designed to
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of
sale of distribution,... any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture,
film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph
recording, electrical transcription, or other article capable of producing sound or any
other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The transportation... of two or more copies of any publication or two or more of
any article of the character described above ... shall create a presumption that such
publications or articles are intended for sale or distribution, but such presumption
shall be rebuttable.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
119. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (indicating that, under Miller test, speech is
considered obscene, and thus not protected by First Amendment, when it: (a) appeals to
prurient interest according to community standards, (b) describes sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and (c) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
120. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709 (concluding that defendants' conduct fell within purview of
statute).
121. 926 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Va. 1996).
122. The statute read, in pertinent part:
Any person who (1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce
or mails any visual depiction, if (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is
of such conduct; or (2) knowingly receives, or distributes any visual depiction that has
been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed or knowingly
reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or
through the malls, if (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such
conduct, shall be [criminally] punished ....
18 U.S.C. § 2252. The statute since has been modified to explicitly cover transmissions made
via computer. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West Supp. 1997).
123. During an FBI search of Ownby's residence, more than 1600 images depicting children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct were found on 76 floppy diskettes and on Ownby's hard
drive. See United States v. Ownby, 926 F. Supp. 558, 561 (W.D. Va. 1996).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) ("receiving by computer a visual depiction, the production
of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct").
125. See id. § 2252(a) (1) ("transporting such an image by computer").
126. See id. § 2252(a) (4) (b) ("possessingthree ormore matters containingsuch depictions").
127. See Ownby, 926 F. Supp. at 560-61.
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regulate the Internet, the court was able to use existing laws to convict
persons using the Internet in a criminal manner.
B. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
Despite the demonstrated effectiveness of existing laws in prevent-
ing crime over computer wires, and despite protests by various
organizations and individuals,"2 Congress sought new regulations
tailored specifically to the expanding medium of electronic communi-
cations known as the Internet."s Spurred by a Time magazine cover
story investigating the level and amount of pornographic material
available on the Internet,' Congress called for new regulations,
reasoning that in light of the dangers on the horizon, existing
regulations would be too cumbersome and ineffective. 32
128. See supra Part HA (detailing use of existing laws to regulate the Internet).
129. See Letter from ACLU and 29 undersigned civil liberties and public interest groups,
Internet service providers, and commercial producers of entertainment, information and
journalism, to Rep. HenryJ. Hyde (R-Il.) (Dec. 5, 1995) <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/
CDA/hydeiletter.html> (urging Hyde and other representatives "to reject all proposals to
impose new government censorship on cyberspace and online communications," arguing that
proposed amendments to telecommunications deregulation legislation were unconstitutional).
Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization established to promote international
human rights, petitioned Congress and the President to avoid regulation of the Internet, arguing
that because the Internet is a form of mass communication without national boundaries, "on-line
censorship laws, in addition to trampling on the free expression rights of a nation's own citizens,
threatens to chill expression globally." Sorensen, supra note 107 (expressing concern that
censorship of "indecent" communication on-line could impede work of Human Rights Watch
and similar organizations that transmit necessarily graphic and explicit accounts of human rights
abuses in an attempt to expose past abuses, educate public about current abuses, and prevent
future atrocities); see also Brock N. Meeks, The Obscenity of Decenty (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://wwww.hotwired.com/Lib/Pivacy/exon.privacy> (arguing that passage of a law
regulating indecent speech on Internet would "cast a bone-deep chill across all forms of online
communication, reducing them to nothing more thought provoking than Hallmark greeting
cards").
130. See 141 CONG. REC. S8087 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) ("I want
to keep the information superhighway from resembling a red-light district. This legislation will
help stop those who electronically cruise the digital universe to engage children in inappropriate
communications.").
131. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38.
132. See 141 CONG. REC. 58335 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
("Attempts to regulate computer networks as we regulate broadcasting and telephones when it
has little in common with either of them, is futile [sic]. It is a unique form of media posing
differing challenges and opportunities .... Congress needs to understand these differences
before we can determine how best to protect children and the constitutional rights of
Americans."); 141 CONG. EC. S8087, 88088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon)
(arguing that CDA "is proposed in the context of this information revolution that is exploding
in our society.... Unfortunately, the current laws ... are woefully out of date with this new
challenge and this new opportunity."). Potentially the most troubling problem with applying
old laws to the Internet is that of applying the Miler community standards test for obscenity to
a method of communication that turns the entire world into the "relevant community." See
generally Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 75 B.U. L. REV. 865 (1995)
(outlining problems with applying current obscenity standards to Internet, arguing that
alternative standards must be created).
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The Time article, entitled On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn,33 claimed
that a very large percentage of images on the Internet were porno-
graphic and that the practice of trading these sexually explicit images
was "one of the largest (if not the largest) recreational applications of
users of computer networks.""s Time based its article on a study of
Internet indecency published in the Georgetown Law Journal ("Rimm
Study").1m
Despite a multitude of sharp attacks challenging the veracity of the
Rimm Study,' Congress focused its attention on the Time article and
the study37 and used them as a catalyst for regulating the
Internet." Senators J.James Exon (D-Neb.) and Daniel R. Coats (R-
Ind.) introduced an amendment to the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (the "Exon Amendment") that would amend 47 U.S.C. § 223 to
criminalize the transmission of obscene and indecent material via a
133. See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 131, at 38.
134. Id. at 38, 40.
135. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Surey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Doumloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers
Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEo. L.J. 1849 (1995).
136. See Claudine Langan, Cyberporn: ... A New Legal Bog (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://www.public.asu.edu/-angcl/history2.html> (noting that Rimm Study received
substantial criticism from scholars,journalists, politicians, and Internet users); see also Donna L.
Hoffman and Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Analysis of the Conceptua Logica and Methodological
Flaws in the Article: "MarketingPornography on the Information Superhighway" (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/rimm.cgi> (attacking the validity of the 83.5% figure, the
misleading origin of the 900,000 images, and the lack of vigorous peer review). A close
examination of the Rimm Study revealed three major problems with the study: (1) Rimm did
not find that 83.5% of all images on the Internet were pornographic; rather he found that
83.5% of all messages in a select number of Usenet newsgroups, which combined constituted
less than 0.5% of the messages on the Internet, were pornographic; (2) Rimm failed to
emphasize that 99.7% of the images he studied were found on private adult bulletin boards that
were not accessible to children; and (3) Rimm, along with Time and Nightlin4 refused to allow
anyone to do an independent review of the study before publication, per a prior arrangement
among the three parties. See id. In an article published three weeks after the Cyberporn article
first ran, even Time magazine questioned the veracity of the Rimm study, upon which it based
the CyberpornarticIe. See Philip Eimer-DeWitt, FireStorm on the Computer Nets, TIME,July 24, 1995,
at 57. The quasi-retraction acknowledged that Time had uncovered facts regarding the ethics
by which the data was gathered that brought Rimm's methodology into severe question and
raised concerns regarding the true authorship of the article. See id. Time also admitted that the
poor quality of its research into the Rimm study, which resulted in the failure to discover
"damaging flaws" in the study, likely arose from interference caused by the exclusivity
arrangement between Time, Rlmm, and the Georgetown Law Journal See id.
137. The Time article and the alarming findings of the Rimm Study were introduced in
Congress in mid-1995 when Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) alerted his fellow Senators and
asked that the Rimm Study be printed in the Congressional Record. See 141 CONG. REC. S9017
(daily ed.June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 141 CONG. REC. 59021 (daily ed.June 26,
1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
138. Citing the study's finding that "83.5 percent of all computerized photographs available
on the Internet are pornographic," Senator Grassley suggested that "Congress must act and do
so in a constitutional manner to help parents who are under assault in this day and age." See
141 CONG. REC. S9017 (daily ed.June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 141 CONG. REC.
S9021 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
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telecommunications device." 9 Although the amendment quickly
passed with wide congressional"4 and public support,'4' many voices
raised a cautionary flag. Senators,' Representatives,1 interest
groups," and even the President argued that the Internet should
139. The proposed amendment made it a felony punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 or
up to two years in prison for anyone, who "by means of telecommunications device knowingly
makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent,
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person .... " S. 652, 104th Cong.
(1995).
140. The amendment passed by a 84-16 vote. See 141 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed.June 14,
1995).
141. Christian Coalition, PressRelease, First Item in Christian Coalition's Contract with theAmerican
Family Passes Senate (June 15,1995) <http://www.cc/org/publicadons/ca/press/contracl.html>
("We applaud Senators Coats and Exon for their decisive step forward to protect our nation's
youth from the real threat of cyber-porn, and we look forward to swift action in the House.").
142. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) expressed concern that Senator Exon's attempt to impose
old forms of regulations on such a new, misunderstood medium, might be rash and ill-
conceived. See 141 CONG. REC. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("[The Internet] has grown as well as it has, as remarkably as it has, primarily because it has not
had a whole lot of people restricting it, regulating it, and touching it and saying, do not do that
or do this or the other thing... I think there is a better way to reach the goal that the Senator
from Nebraska [Senator Exon] and I share. The goal is ... to keep the really filthy material
out of the hand [sic] of children."). In an attempt to preventmaking regulatory decisions based
on misinformation, Senator Leahy proposed a bill insisting that a thorough study of Internet
indecency and the best means of regulating it be conducted. See S. 714, 104th Cong. (1995)
(requiring "the Attorney General to study and report to Congress on the means of controlling
the flow of violent, sexually explicit, harassing, offensive, or otherwise unwanted material in the
interactive telecommunications systems"); see also Leahy Statement on CDAAlternative (Apr. 10,
1995) <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/CDA/S714jeahy-press-release.html> ("Before legislat-
ing to impose heavy-handed regulation on the content of communications, I feel we need more
information from law enforcement and telecommunications officials.").
143. Even traditionally conservative members of Congress such as Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich (R-Ga.) found that the bill was extreme and ill-conceived, stating,
I think that the Amendment... will have no real meaning and have no real impact
and in fact I don't think [it] will survive. It is clearly a violation of free speech and it's
a violation of the right of adults to communicate with each other. I don't agree with
it and I don't think it is a serious way to discuss a serious issue.
Gingrich Says CDA Is a "Clear Violation" of Free Speech Rights (June 20, 1995) <http://vw.
cdtorg/policy/freespeech/gingoppose.htl> (reproducing comments made by Speaker
Gingrich on national television show Progress Report).
144. See Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) Statement on Communications Decency Act
(Mar. 24, 1995) <http://ivw.epic.org/free._speech/CDA/epic_.statement.html> (arguing that
CDA is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech, personal privacy, and intellectual
freedom, and that comprehensive hearings should be held before it or any similar regulation
is adopted); Mike Godwin and Shari Steele, ConstitutionalProblems with the CommunicationsDecency
Amendment: A Legislative Analysis by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (OcL 10, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cda-passage-eff.analysis> (arguing that the legislation "imposes
content restrictions on computer communications that would chill First Amendment-protected
speech and, in effect, restrict adults in the public forums of computer networks to writing and
reading only such content as is suitable for children").
145. Administration Concerns Regarding S. 652 (visited Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/
policy/legislation/admins652_comnts.html#flrst.amdt> ("The piecemeal approach taken in this
legislation [the Exon Amendment] is inadvisable. Instead, a comprehensive review should be
undertaken, including Congressional hearings.").
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have been researched further before antiquated regulations were
extended to such a new medium. 146
Despite the absence of virtually any debate or hearings on the
issue, 47 Congress included the Exon Amendment in the final draft of
the Telecommunications Act."4 Members of Congress failed to heed
Representative Ron Wyden's (D-Or.) warning that "[t]he Internet is
the shining star of the information age, and government censorship
could spoil much of its promise. " 149 In early 1996, Congress passed
and the President signed into law the Exon Amendment, renamed the
Communications Decency Act, as part of the sweeping Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996.150
In its final form, the CDA made it a felony for any person using a
"telecommunications device" to transmit an "obscene" or "indecent"
146. See supra notes 140-45 (discussing opposition of, and support for, the Exon Amend-
ment).
147. Ironically, the first Senate hearings on the issue of regulating indecent and obscene
material on the Internet were held ten days after the passage of the Exon Amendment. See
Judiday Committee Heating on Cqberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of Technology
and the Needfor CongresionalAction, 104th Cong. (1995). The Senate Judiciary Committee did
not convene to consider the already-passed CDA, but a separate bill sponsored by Senator
Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) which proposed to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to authorize the
criminal division of the Justice Departnent, rather than the FCC, to prosecute those who
knowingly allow their network to be used to transmit indecent material to minors. SeeProtection
of Children from Computer Pornography Act, S. 892, 104th Cong. (1995). Critics viewed the
hearings, which lasted a total of three hours, as fruitless in their attempt to demonstrate the
logic behind broad regulation of the Internet. See Center for Democracy and Technology, A
Briefing on Public Policy Issues Affecting Civil Liberties Online, CDT POuCY POST 22 (July 26, 1995)
<http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp220726.hnl> (noting that while the hearings successfully
demonstrated sexually explicit material available on Internet, "the hearing illustrated that
current law is sufficient to prosecute those who stalk or solicit children online, and that complex
constitutional issues are raised by congressional attempts to restrict indecent material on the
Internete).
148. See Langan, supra note 186 (noting-that in bill's Conference Committee, the Exon
Amendment was adopted at the last minute in place of an alternative amendment that was
proposed by Representatives Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) and Ron Wyden (D-Or.)). The Cox-
Wyden Amendment, which passed in the House of Representatives by a 420-4 margin but was
discarded by the Conference Committee in favor of the Exon Amendment, prohibited FCC
regulation of the Internet, protected computer services providers from criminal liability reserved
for content providers, removed restrictions on the development of filtering technology, and
suggested that parental and educational guidance were the best guard to protect the innocence
of children. See Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong.
(1995).
149. 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
150. The House and Senate passed the Act by wide margins of 414-16 and 91-5, respectively.
See 142 CONG. REc. H1141-44 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S1172 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
1996). Seven days after the passage of the Act, President Clinton signed the bill into law in a
high profile, historic ceremony at the Library of Congress. See President's Remarks on Signing
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 329 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOG. 215, 218 (Feb. 8, 1996).
President Clinton signed the Act, however, with reservations as to the constitutionality of the
restrictions on free speech contained in the CDA. SeeSilvergate, supra note 110, atA19 (noting
concerns of President, civil libertarians, computer communications experts, and many others as
to overbroad scope of CDA).
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communication "knowing that the recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age."15' The Act further criminalized communica-
tions to minors that, "in context, depict[] or describe[], in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs."15 2 Finally, the CDA made
it a crime to "use[] an interactive computer service to send [such
materials] to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age"1
5 3
or to "display [such material] in a manner available" to any person
under eighteen)
151. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1) (B) (West Supp. 1997). The CDA states, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass another person;
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly--
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene or indecent; knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years
of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or
initiated the communication.., or...
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunication facility under his control to be used
for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity, shall be fined under Title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.
Id § 223(a) (emphasis added); and
(d) Whoever-
(1) In interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that,
in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
Id& § 223(d) (emphasis added).
152. Mi § 223(d)(1).
153. Id § 223(d)(1)(A).
154. Seeid. § 223(d)(1)(B).
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A. The Case's Origins
Within hours of President Clinton's signing of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 into law, civil libertarians initiated the first constitu-
tional challenge to the Communications Decency Act. In Philadel-
phia, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
ACLU filed affidavits supporting their request for injunctive relief to
enjoin the enforcement of the CDA.1
5 5
In its challenge to the Act, the ACLU argued that the CDA was
unconstitutionally overbroad because its provisions unnecessarily
regulated constitutionally-protected speech, and that it was unconstitu-
tionally vague in its failure to adequately define the term "inde-
cent."15 Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter, to whom the case was as-
signed, agreed with the ACLU, granting a limited temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of certain provisions of
the CDA pending the outcome of a decision of a three-judge panel
155. See ACLU v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996).
At the same time, a similar request for injunctive relief was filed in the Southern District of New
York by Joe Shea, the editor-in-chief and publisher of a daily online newspaper. See Shea v.
Reno, 1996 WL 427610, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996); see also infra note 180 and accompanying
text (outlining facts in Shea).
The American Library Association filed a similar challenge to the CDA on behalf of nearly
30 plaintiffs. The suit was subsequently consolidated with ACLU v. Reno and argued together.
ACLU Background Briefing (Oct. 31, 1996) <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/CDA/laivsuit/
adubriefing._31.html>. Once the ACLU case and the AILA case were consolidated, the list
of plaintiffs included: the American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Electron Frontier Foundation, Journalism Education Association,
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, National Writers Union, Clarinet Communica-
tions Corp., Institute for Global Communications, Stop Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global
Information System, Bibiobytes, Queer Resources Directory, Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.,
Wildcat Press, Inc., Declan McCullagh d/b/aJustice on Campus, Brock Meeks d/b/a Cyberwire
Dispatch, John Troyer d/b/a The Safer Sex Page, Jonathan Wallace d/b/a The Ethical
Spectacle, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., America Library Association, Inc.,
America Online, Inc., American Booksellers Association, Inc., American Booksellers Foundation
for Free Expression, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Apply Computer, Inc., Association
of American Publishers, Inc., Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers, Citizens Internet
Empowerment Coalition, Commercial Internet Exchange Association, CompuServe Incorporat-
ed, Families Against Internet Censorship, Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc., Health Sciences
Libraries Consortium, Hotwired Ventures LLC, Interactive Digital Software Association,
Interactive Services Association, Magazine Publishers of America, Microsoft Corporation, The
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., National Press Photographers Association, Netcom Online
Communications Services, Inc., NewspaperAssociation ofAmerica, Opnet, Inc., Prodigy Services
Company, Society of ProfessionalJournalists, and Wired Ventures, Ltd. See Brief for Appellants
at ii, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511), available in 1997 WL 32931 (Jan. 21,
1997).
156. SeeACLU v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996).
Plaintiffs argued that "as a result of the vagueness of the crimes created by the Act, they do not
even know what speech or other actions might subject them to prosecution," and that "even
attempts to self-censor could prove fruidess." Id
1974
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tasked with deciding whether to grant the ACLU's motion for a
preliminary injunction.'
7
B. District Court's Preliminary Injunction
Unlike Congress, the three-judge panel deciding ACLU v. Rnd 5
conducted extensive evidentiary hearings to gain the greatest possible
understanding of the Internet before deciding whether to uphold or
strike down the regulations applying to the unique new medium."'
With the benefit of those hearings, the court laid out over 120
findings of fact in its opinion. 6
The Findings of Fact section in the court's opinion, which is
lengthier than any of the three judges' individual discussions of the
law, describes the Internet as a "unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication." l" The findings set out in
specific detail the nature of cyberspace, 62 the history of the
Internet," methods of accessing and communicating over the
Internet,"  the emergence of the World Wide Web," the range of
content available on the Internet (including the amount and types of
157. See id. at *4 ("The defendant, her agents, and her servants are hereby ENJOINED from
enforcing against plaintiffs provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1) (B) (ii), insofar as they extend to
'indecent,' but not 'obscene.'"). The panel was formed pursuant to a provision of the
Telecommunications Act that provided that any civil action challenging the constitutionality of
the CDA would be heard by such a panel. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 561(a) ("[Any civil action
challenging the constitutionality, on its face, of this title or any amendment made by this title,
or any provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of 3judges convened pursuant to the
provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.").
158. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affld, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
159. See, e.g., Daniel G. Bergstein & Michelle Weisberg Cohen, Cybersmut Goes on Trial-Federal
Courts Hold CDA Unconstitutional, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 23, 1996, at S1 (discussing three-judge panel's
"extensive evidentiary hearings" conducted to gain an understanding of the Internet and how
to apply First Amendment to it); Harvey Berkman, Medium is Message, NAT'L U., Aug. 19, 1996,
at Al (characterizing Congress' three-hour hearing on problem of cyberporn as "limited" and
.perfunctory" when compared with the ACLU court's six days of comprehensive, probing
hearings); Mike Godwin, Cyber Rights Now: Dancing in the Streets, Wman, Sept. 1996, at 92
(predicting that because of three-judge panel's demonstrated understanding of Internet and its
role in society, comprehensive record regarding Internet contained in court's Findings of Fact
will be relied upon and cited by subsequent courts in many cases involving Internet). But see
Berkman, supra, at Al (quoting Patrick A. Trueman, Director of Legal Affairs for American
Family Association) ("The Philadelphia court was far more impressed with the Internet than the
Constitution and devoted far more of its opinion to the workings of the Internet than to the
law.").
160. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
161. Id. at 844. The Findings of Fact section of the court's opinion consists of approximately
nineteen pages of text, while Judge Sloviter's, Buckwalter's, and Dalzell's discussion of law
consists of approximately eight, seven, and eighteen pages, respectively. See id.
162. See i& at 830-42.
163. See id. at 831-32.
164. See id. at 832-36.
165. See id. at 836-38.
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sexually explicit content)," and the various methods of restricting
access to the Internet other than government regulation."6 7
Keeping a close eye on the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding the standard of review applicable to the
regulation of mass communications, the court placed great emphasis
on these findings of fact. Following the medium-specific approach to
mass communications," the court acknowledged the necessity of
"examin[ing] the underlying technology of the communication to
find the proper fit between First Amendment values and competing
interests." 69 Focusing on the unique characteristics of the Internet,
the court attempted to determine whether the medium bore greater
similarity to telephone communications or to broadcast communica-
tions.' 70
Applying the findings of fact, the court found evidence that
Internet communication, while unique in its own right, is much more
akin to telephone communication than it is to broadcasting.17 1 The
court noted that, as with a telephone, a person using the Internet
must act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific information
online. 72 The court acknowledged that there is a large amount of
sexually explicit material available on the Internet,1T7 but added that
it is highly unlikely that children would randomly come across
"indecent" or "patently offensive" material while "surfing" the
Internet. 4  The court further recognized that unlike broadcast
communication, where anything and everything that flows over the
airwaves "assaults" a "captive audience," the Internet requires
166. See id. at 842-45.
167. See id. at 838-42, 845-49.
168. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (explaining Court's tendency to examine
characteristics unique to each new form of communication when determining applicable level
of First Amendment protection).
169. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873.
170. See id. at 851. If the court found it similar to telephone communications, the Internet
would deserve greater First Amendment protection, requiring the application of strict scrutiny
to any government-imposed content-based restriction on speech. See id. (citing Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). If the court found the Internet
more akin to broadcasting, however, it would deserve a lesser level of constitutional protection,
and regulations applicable to it would be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny. See id.
171. See id. at 851-52 (noting that "the evidence and Findings of Fact based thereon show
that Internet communication, while unique, is more akin to telephone communication, at issue
in Sabl- than to broadcasting, at issue in Pacficd').
172. See id. (asserting that with both mediums, the user must act affirnatively to retrieve
information).
173. See id. at 844 ("Such material includes text, pictures, and chat, and includes bulletin
boards, newsgroups, and the other forms of Internet communication, and extends from the
modestly titillating to the hardest-core.").
174. See id. at 851-52.
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affirmative action by the user and lacks the element of surprise
associated with broadcasting.
175
Because of the Internet's lack of resemblance to broadcast
communications under a medium-specific analysis, the court in ACLU
applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to the CDA. 176 The court
acknowledged the government's compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them
from indecent and patently offensive material,177 but under a strict
scrutiny analysis found that the CDA was unconstitutional due to its
overbreadth l7 s and because of its failure to adopt the least restrictive
means of achieving the compelling government interest. 79
175. See i&. (noting that users, while "surfing" the Web, virtually always receive some warning
of content of materials before they appear, thus significantly reducing element of "assault"
unique to broadcasting).
176. See iUL at 851 (declaring that because the ODA is a "government-imposed content-based
restriction on speech," it is subject to strict scrutiny, and "will only be upheld if it is justified by
a compelling government interest and if it is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest."). The
Court analogized the CDA's regulation of the Internet to the FCC's regulation of telephone
communications in Sable stating that:
[T] he evidence and our Findings of Fact based thereon show that Internet communica-
tion, while unique, is more akin to telephone communication, at issue in SaWbl than
to broadcasting, at issue in Pacifica, because, as with the telephone, an Internet user
must act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific information online.
I& at 851-52.
177. See i. at 852-53 (noting inadequacies in government's proof of compelling state
interest).
178. See id. at 854-55. Noting the unconstitutionality of regulations that sweep more broadly
than necessary, thereby chilling the expression of protected speech, the court found that
because of the nature of the Internet, compliance with the CDA would result in the banning
of constitutionally-protected speech. See i&. at 854 (finding that "it is either technologically
impossible or economically prohibitive for many of the plaintiffs to comply with the CDA
without seriously impeding their posting of online material which adults have a constitutional
right to access"). The three-judge panel held that because the CDA forced speakers to choose
between complete silence or the risk of prosecution, it implicitly instituted a complete ban on
speech that affected adults as well as children, and thus was overbroad. See id at 855.
179. See id. at 855-57. The court rejected the Government's assertion that the statutory
defenses attached to the CDA prove that it was designed to achieve the compelling government
interest using the least restrictive means. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57 (rejecting the CDA's
good faith and verified credit card/adult identification provision defenses, reasoning that
neither defense was technologically or economically feasible for majority of content providers).
The court also determined that the CDA was not narrowly tailored because of the vagueness of
its definition of the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive." See id at 856 (finding that the
two terms are inherently vague, "particularly in light of the government's inability to identify the
relevant community standards by which the material should be judged"). The CDA also fails
to adequately define the word "indecency," and offers no guidelines as to its parameters. See id
at 861. Finally, the court determined that the CDA ultimately failed strict scrutiny because it
attempted to achieve ends that current laws adequately addressed. See id. at 856-57 (arguing that
vigorous enforcement of current obscenity and child pornography laws would protect minors
from exposure to patently unsuitable material on Internet). The court also noted the U.S.
Justice Department's concurrence on this point, as evidenced by a letter to Senator Leahy
regarding the prosecution of Internet crime. See i& at 857 (citing 141 CONG. REc. S8342 (daily
ed. June 14, 1995) (reprinting portion of letter from Kent Marcus, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, to Sen. Leahy, which communicated the view that existing laws adequately cover online
obscenity, child pornography, and child solicitation).
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Based on these conclusions, the district court in ACLU v. Reno
granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Communications DecencyAct of 1996."s The Government thereafter
filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court,"1 and the Court accepted
the case in late 1996 for ]review.1
8 2
C. Supreme Court's Decision
In its review of the Communications Decency Act, the Supreme
Court in Reno v. ACU closely followed the district court's reasoning
and conclusions, emphatically denouncing the CDA as a patently
overbroad, unconstitutional attempt to regulate the content of
speech."t Adopting a medium specific analysis, the Court granted the
highest level of protection to the Internet and subjected the CDA to
180. See id. at 857 (stating court's certainty that plaintiffs would prevail on merits of their
argument that CDA was facially invalid under First and Fifth Amendments). The District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted a similar preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the CDA a few months later in the case of Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aftd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997). The case was brought byJoe Shea, the editor and
publisher of a daily Internet newspaper that posted a scathing commentary of the CDA on the
day it was signed into law by President Clinton. SeeJoe Shea, We're Going to War, 2 THE AM. REP.
219 (Feb. 8, 1996) <http://www.newshare.com/current/censor/excerpts.htnl>. Written by a
Texas Judge, Steve Russel, the article vehemently attacked the CDA as unconstitutional on its
face, frequently using the "indecent" and "patently offensive" words that the new law was
designed to ban from the Internet. See Steve Russel, The X-On Congress: Indecent Comment on an
Indecent Subject, 2 THE AM. REP. 219 (Feb. 8, 1996) <http://www.newshare.com/
current/censor/excerpts.html> ("You motherfuckers in Congress have dropped over the edge
of the earth this time .... [] ou have sold out the FirstAmendment."). Applying strict scrutiny,
the court in Shea acknowledged that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
minors from harmful material, but found that the means used by the government, namely the
CDA, were not narrowly tailored to that legitimate end. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 941-50. The
court, like the one in ACLU, refused to accept the Government's main argument that the Act's
two affirmative defenses were sufficient to offset its broad reach. See id. at 948 (holding that
good faith and verified account defenses were not viable because they were technologically or
economically unavailable to most providers). The court determined that without the availability
of viable defenses to criminal prosecution, the CDA was so broad as to effectively ban
constitutionally protected material on the Internet. See id. at 948 ("In sum, there is no
persuasive evidence that a substantial proportion of Internet content providers can make
available material potentially within the scope of the CDA without fear of prosecution and
criminal liability.").
181. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W.
3318 (U.S. Oct. 22,1996) (No. 96-511), cert. granted 65 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1996), aflld,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The government also filed ajurisdictional Statement in the appeal of
Shea v. Reno, asking the Court to reserve judgment on Shea until Reno v. ACLU was resolved.
ACLU Background Briefing (Oct. 31, 1996) <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/CDA/lawsuit/
aclu_briefing_10_31.html>. The Supreme Court was the next, and final, arbiter, of the CDA's
constitutionality pursuant to a section of the CDA mandating an expedited appeals process. See
47 U.S.CA. § 561(b) (West Supp. 1997) ("[A]n interlocutory orfinaljudgment, decree, or order
of the court of 3 judges in an action under subsection (a) holding this title or an amendment
made by this title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a matter of
right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court.").
182. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
183. See id.
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strict scrutiny review.'s Under such scrutiny, the Court determined
by a 7-2 margins that while the Act might have sought to accomplish
a legitimate governmental interest,8 ' it did so in a way that placed too
great a burden on protected speech and thereby threatened "to torch
a large segment of the Internet community."1
87
1. Medium-specific analysis
After disposing of the Government's contention that the CDA was
facially constitutional under a patchwork of prior decisions, 188 the
184. See id at 2344 ("[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].").
185. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by ChiefJustice William Rehnquist, concurred in
the judgement and dissented in part. See id. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor analyzed the CDA as a zoning law that sought to create "adult zones" on the Interaet.
See id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Adopting the analysis used by the Court in previous
cases where the constitutionality of zoning laws were in question, O'Connor determined that
only one of the CDA's provisions was unconstitutional, and that two others were unconstitutional
only in certain circumstances. See id. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that under
the Court's current zoning law jurisprudence, such a law is valid if "(I) it does not unduly
restrict adult access to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or
view the banned material"). O'Connor agreed with the majority that 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1) (B),
which criminalized the display of patently offensive messages or images "in a[ny] manner
available" to minors, was unconstitutional because it failed the first prong of the test, in that it
unduly restricted adult access to such material. See id. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
O'Connor differed from the majority, however, in arguing that § 223(d) (1) (A), which made it
a crime to knowingly send a patently offensive message or image to a specific person under the
age of 18, and § 223(a) (1) (B), which made it a crime to knowingly transmit an obscene or
indecent message or image to a person the sender knows is under 18 years old, similarly failed
the first prong and were unconstitutional only in certain situations, namely when the sender of
the information believes that he is sending the material to adults and possibly children. See id.
at 2355 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor argued that the two provisions withstood
constitutional scrutiny, however, when they were applied to the transmission of Internet
communications where the party initiating the communication knows that all of the recipients
are minors. See id. at 2355-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. See id, at 2345 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)) (stating that
Court has repeatedly recognized governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
187. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
188. See id. at 2341-43. The Court rejected the Government's contention that the CDA was
"plainly constitutional" under three cases that upheld statutes restricting speech in an attempt
to protect children: Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacfica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978); and Ginsbergv. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
The Court distinguished the New York statute upheld in Ginsberg that prohibited the sale of
material considered obscene as to minors under 17 years of age from the CDA in four ways:
(1) while the New York statute explicitiy allowed parents to purchase such magazines for their
children, the CDA did not present a similar option; (2) while the NewYork statute applied only
to commercial transactions, the CDA contained no such limitation; (3) while the New York
statute required that the offensive material be "utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors," the CDA failed to provide guidelines as to how the terms "indecent" or "patently
offensive" should be interpreted; and (4) while the New York statute defined a minor as a
person under the age of 17, the CDA applied to those under the age of 18. See id. The Court
also refused to accept the government's reliance on Pacfica, a case in which the Court upheld
the regulation of indecent materials broadcast over the radio. See id. at 2341-42. The Court
here distinguished its holding in Pacfica in three ways, arguing- (1) that the regulation of
speech in Pacfica dictated only when indecent content could be broadcast, while the CDA
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Court turned to the traditional analysis used when the government
attempts to regulate new forms of mass communication: medium-
specific analysis.' Recognizing that the only form of communication
to receive a reduced level of First Amendment protection in the past
was the broadcast medium, 90 the Court set out to determine whether
the Internet shared those characteristics unique to the broadcast
medium which would indicate that the Internet, too, should receive
anything less than the highest level of constitutional protection.' 9'
In conducting its medium-specific analysis, the Court examined one
of the main characteristics unique to broadcasting that warranted a
lower level of First Amendment protection, its history of extensive
government regulation. In Pacifica, the Court found that legislation
prohibiting the transmission of indecent speech was applied to a
medium that had been heavily regulated in the past.1'9 The Court in
Reno, however, pointed out that the "vast democratic fora of the
Internet [has never] been subject to the type of government
supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast indus-
try."
193
The Court also considered a second characteristic unique to
broadcasting that was heavily relied upon in Pacifica, the "invasiveness"
of radio and television broadcasts."9 Much like the district court in
ACLU v. Reno, the Court here analogized the characteristics of the
completely banned the transmission of such content at any time and in any manner, (2) that
the Court in Pacifica specifically refused to decide whether violation of the regulation would
justify a criminal prosecution, while the CDAwould requirejust that; and (3) that the regulation
in Pacfica applied to a medium which as a matter of history had received very limited First
Amendment protection, while the CDA sought to regulate a new form of communication, the
Internet, which did not have the same characteristics justifying the lower level of protection
offered to the broadcast medium. See id at 234243. Finally, the Court refused to find the CDA
plainly constitutional based on its ruling in Renton, a case upholding the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods. See id. The
Court distinguished Renton by pointing out that while the zoning ordinance at issue in the case
was a "time, place, and manner regulation" that was aimed at the secondary effects of adult
movie theaters (crime, deteriorating property values, etc.), the CDA here was a content-based
blanket restriction on speech that required a higher level of First Amendment constitutional
scrutiny. See id
189. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348. See generally supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text
(explaining Court's tendency to examine characteristics unique to each new form of
communication when determining applicable level of First Amendment protection).
190. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
191. See id. at 2343-44.
192. See id. at 2343 (noting that radio stations were allowed to operate only pursuant to
federal license, and without legislation regulating indecency, there was risk that "members of
the radio audience might infer some sort of official or societal approval of whatever was heard
over the radio" (citing Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Levanthal, J.,
dissenting), revda 438 U.S. 726 (1978))).
193. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
194. See id. at 2343.
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Internet to those of the telephone in Sable.95 Echoing the Court's
reasoning in Sable and the lower court's reasoning in ACLU, the Court
found that the Internet is not a medium of communication that
deserves a qualified level of First Amendment protection because of
an invasive nature.196 To the contrary, the Court observed, the
Internet is a medium through which users seldom encounter content
accidentally, and one which, unlike communications received by radio
or television, "requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate
and directed than merely turning a dial."197
Finally, the Court concluded that a third characteristic specific to
broadcast communications which warranted reduced constitutional
protection, "scarcity," also was not a characteristic that the Internet
shared. 9 ' The Court observed that when Congress first authorized
the regulation of the broadcast spectrum, it partially justified its
actions by pointing to the need to protect such a scarce expressive
commodity."9 The Internet, in stark contrast, "[p]rovides relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds,"" °
thereby facilitating a wealth of communication that is "'as diverse as
human thought."'2 °1 Thus, because the Internet lacks the scarcity,
invasiveness, or history of regulation unique to broadcasting, the
Court submitted that there is no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment protection applied to the medium.0 2
2. Strict scrutiny review
Once the Court determined that the level of constitutional
protection afforded the Internet should not be qualified, it applied
the same level of protection that the district court had applied and
that the Court had applied to all forms of communication other than
broadcast: strict scrutiny. Using this analysis, the Court asked
whether the CDA served a compelling government interest, and
195. See id. at 2343-44 (stating that Court in Sable distinguished Pafica in on the basis that
telephone communications do not share unique characteristics-namely, an invasive nature that
often takes listeners by surprise with indecent messages-that broadcast communications have
which justify the application of qualified level of First Amendment protection).
196. See id.
197. See ia at 2336 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997)).
198. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
199. See id.
200. See id. (declaring that Internet "includes not only traditional print and news services,
but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue," chat rooms
through which "any person with a phone line can become a town crier," and Web pages, mail
exploders, and newsgroups through which "the same individual can become a pamphleteer").
201. Id (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842).
202. SeeReno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
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whether it was narrowly tailored to accomplishes that end using the
least restrictive means.203  The Court concluded that despite the
CDA's honorable intentions, 0 4 its vagueness and its facial over-
breadth were clear evidence that Congress' attempt to regulate the
Internet had resulted in a patently invalid constitutional provision
2 5
that placed an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech.2°
a. Vagueness
Insisting that "the CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be




the Court contended that the statute was defective in exactly this
way.20" By failing to narrowly tailor the language of the statute, the
Court explained, Congress passed an act that was dangerously vague
and clearly unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis.2°
Specifically, the Court pointed to Congress' lack of consistency in
defining the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive. "21 Each
term is used in one of the two main provisions of the CDA, and
neither is accompanied by even an attempt at a definition.21 Pointing
out that such inconsistency and differences in language would
provoke uncertainty among speakers on the Internet, the Court
proclaimed that such indefiniteness "undermines the likelihood that
the CDA [was] carefully tailored to the congressional goal of
protecting minors from potentially harmful materials."
212
The Court noted that the vagueness of the statute was particularly
critical for two reasons: (1) because the CDA, as a content-based
regulation of speech, runs the risk of having a chilling effect on free
speech; and (2) because the CDA is a statute that provides criminal
sanctions which could cause speakers to remain silent rather than run
the risk of communicating even arguably unlawful words, ideas, or
images.213 Considering this increased deterrent effect, coupled with
203. See id. at 2344-50 (discussing whether statute was narrowly tailored, whether
government's three defenses to claimed overbreadth of statute were tenable, and whether
statute's two affirmative defenses were effective in preserving statute's constitutionality).
204. See id at 2345 (noting that protection of children from harmful materials is legitimate
governmental interest).
205. See id. at 2350.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 2346.
208. See i. at 2344-46 (examining whether statute's vagueness proves that it is not narrowly
tailored to achieve its admittedly compelling government interest).
209. See id. at 2346.
210. See id. at 2344.
211. See id.
212. I&
213. See id. at 2344-45.
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the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, the Court deter-
mined that the CDA "unquestionably silence [d] some speakers whose
messages would be entitled to constitutional protection," and as such
failed to pass strict scrutiny.214
b. Overbreadth
While recognizing that the vagueness of the statute was significant
in compromising its constitutionality, the Court in Reno placed even
greater emphasis on the CDA's facial overbreadth.215 While acknowl-
edging the fact that the statute was enacted for the important purpose
of protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material, the
Court reemphasized its commitment to making sure that Congress
designs statutes that accomplish their purposes without imposing
unnecessarily great restrictions on speech.216  In response to this
concern, the Court definitively held that Congress failed in its
legislative duties by passing a law with blanket restrictions over free
speech that were "wholly unprecedented."217
The CDA's overbreadth, the Court argued, was evident in two
primary ways: in its infringement upon the First Amendment rights
of adults, and in its application to such a broad spectrum of
speech.21' The Court first pointed out the way in which the statute
sought to protect children at the expense of the constitutional rights
of adults. 9 The Court explained that in attempting to keep indecent
material out of the hands of children, the government may not
reduce the material that the adult population receives to the same
level as that which children receive.22' By placing a complete ban on
indecent material, however, the CDA did just this.22'
214. See id. at 2346.
215. See id. at 2346-50.
216. See id at 2346-47 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116
S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
217. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346-47.
218. See id. at 2346-48.
219. See id. at 2346-47.
220. See id. at 2346 (asserting that government may not "reduce the adult population to only
what is fit for children" (quoting DenverArea, 116 S. Ct. at 2393) (plurality opinion)). The Court
further reemphasized the fact that sexual expression which is indecent, but not obscene, receives
the full protection of the First Amendment. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
221. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346-47 (arguing that CDA, like regulation on "dial-a-porn"
invalidated in Sable constitutes complete ban on indecent speech). The Court emphasized the
district court's finding that technology does not exist that would allow the sender of indecent
material to identify the age of the recipient of the information on the Internet. See id. at 2347.
Without such technology-which, due to the Internet's inherent infrastructure will likely never
be available-the CDA"inevitably curtail[s] a significant amount of adult communication on the
Internet." See id.
1997] 1983
1984 THE AMERICAN UN1VERSriY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1945
The Court further argued that the CDA's overbreadth was visible in
its application to such a broad variety of speech.2" While the speech
regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica were strictly limited to
commercial speech or commercial entities, the CDA was infinitely
open-ended.223 The prohibitions, the Court observed, shackled
everything from nonprofit entities offering educational material on
the World Wide Web,224 to parents offering safe sex advice to their
children via E-mail,2" to the Carnegie Library placing its card
catalogue online.226
Considering the extent of the statute's overbreadth, the Court
determined that the CDA lacked the precision that the First Amend-
ment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.227
Pointing out Congress' hasty, uninformed drafting of such a sweeping
piece of government regulation,228 and noting the government's
failure to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as
effective as the CDA,229 the Court held that the statute was not
222. See id. at 2347-48.
223. See id. at 2347. See also supra note 188 (describing regulations upheld in Ginsberg and
Pacifica).
224. See id. at 2347-48 (contending that persons facilitating discussions about prison rape or
safe sexual practices on Web site would be committing felony under CDA).
225. See id. at 2348 (submitting that parent allowing her 17-year-old child to use family
computer to obtain arguably indecent information on Internet, or birth control information to
the same child via e-mail, could face lengthy prison term under CDA).
226. See id. at 2347-48 (explaining that maintenance of library card catalogues containing
arguably indecent words could expose libraries to criminal liability under ODA).
227. See i&L at 2346 (finding that in its attempt to deny minors access to potentially harmful
speech, "the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another").
228. See id at 2348 (focusing on absence of any detailed findings by Congress as to nature
of Internet, "or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA").
229. See id. The government offered three of its own defenses, see id. at 2348-49, and pointed
to two affirmative defenses in the ODA, see id. at 2349-50, in an attempt to prove that the
statute's burden on adult speech was not so great as to invalidate the statute under strict
scrutiny; the Court rejected all of these defenses. See i& at 2350 (finding that government failed
to prove that proffered defenses constituted "the sort of 'narrow tailoring' that [would] save an
otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision").
The three defenses offered by the government that the Court rejected were (1) that the CDA
is constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of communication (the
Court found that such a defense relies on a "time, place, and manner" analysis, which is
inapplicable here); (2) that the plain meaning of the Act's "knowledge" and "specific person"
requirements significantly restrict its permissible applications (the Court argued that the nature
of the Internet prevents the knowledge requirement from having any real meaning, as it is
virtually impossible to ever have true knowledge ofwho specifically is receiving the information);
and (3) that the CDA's prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material lacking redeeming
social value (the Court stated that there is no textual support in the Act for the argument that
material having scientific, education, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside
the CDA's "patently offensive" and "indecent" prohibitions). See iU. at 2348-49.
The two statutory affirmative defenses that the Court rejected were (1) that under the "good
faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" provision, "tagging" by the sender of
information provides a valid defense (the Court termed the defense "illusory," observing that
tagging technology is not yet available, and even if it does become available, there is no way to
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narrowly tailored, that it failed strict scrutiny analysis, and that it was
facially unconstitutional." The Court concluded by observing that if
the speech restriction in Sable amounted to "'bum[ing] the house to
roast the pig,'"23' the CDA, "casting a far darker shadow over free
speech, threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the Internet
community."
232
IV INSULATING THE INTERNET AND THE FUTURE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's holding in Reno v. ACLUhas been hailed by
CDA critics and civil libertarians as a mighty firewall that will protect
the Internet in the future from the torching effects of censorship.233
The Court's recognition of the Internet as an emerging form of
communication that warrants the highest level of First Amendment
protection has led pundits to describe the decision as everything from
the "legal birth certificate of the Internet"234 to the "Bill of Rights
for the 21st century."
235
guarantee that all senders will "ag" their material); and (2) that the verified credit card/adult
identification provision saves the constitutionality of the Act (the Court reasoned that because
such verification technology is not economically feasible for most non-commercial speakers, the
unproven technology does not save the statute). See id at 2349-50.
230. See id. at 2350 (agreeing with district court's conclusion that CDA "places an
unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the
sort of'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision").
231. Id at 2350 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127
(1989)).
232. Id. at 2350.
233. See, e.g., EPIC Statement on Supreme Court CDA Victoiy (visited Nov. 15, 1997)
<http://vwv2.epic.org./cda/epic.sup_ct_.statement.html> (quoting David Sobel, co-counsel for
EPIC in the suit, who remarked that the Court's decision, which "defines the First Amendment
for the next century," is written on a clean slate and "establishe[s] the fundamental principles
that will govern free speech issues for the electronic age"); Press Release, Electronic Frontier
Foundation Statement: Supreme Court Iictoy for Free Speech: CDA Ruled Unconstitutional (June 26,
1997) <http://ww~v.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/ACLUv._Reno/19970626._eff_cda.announce>
[hereinafter EFFress Reease] (noting that the decision marks "a major victory in the Electronic
Frontier Foundation's ongoing efforts to ensure that the long-standing American principles of
freedom of expression be preserved and extended to the Internet"); Supreme Court Rules:
Cyberspace Will be Free! ACLU Hails VIrctoiy in Internet Censorship Challenge (June 26, 1997)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/nO62697a.html> (observing ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser's
statement that ruling is "an unprecedented breakthrough in the fight to determine the future
of free speech in the next century"). Ann Beeson, ACLU attorney and member of the legal
team litigating the case, argued further that the Supreme Court's ruling, when coupled with
recent state court decisions coming to similar conclusions regarding Internet regulation,
"create[] a body of law that will help ensure that the free speech principles embodied in our
Constitution apply with the same force on the Internet as they do in the morning paper, in the
town square, and in the privacy of our own homes." Id.
234. Edward Felsenthal &Jared Sandberg, High Court Strikes Donm Internet Smut Law, WALL
ST.J.,June 27, 1997, at BI (quoting statement made by attorney Bruce Ennis, who represented
groups challenging the law).
235. John Schwartz & Joan Biskupic, 1st Amendment Applies To Internet, Justices Say, WASH.
Posr, June 27, 1997, at Al (quoting statement made by Jerry Berman of Center for Democracy
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These two characterizations of the Internet reflect the profound
impact that the Court's decision is likely to have on the medium, yet
at the same time they appropriately acknowledge the fact that the
decision is only a starting point-a birth certificate, a declaration of
rights-from which future constitutional protection of the Internet
and even newer forms of communication will derive. The question
that arises, then, is whether Reno v. ACLU will sufficiently protect
against future attempts at censorship that might again threaten to
torch the Internet or other forms of mass communication.
A. An Alternative to the Court's Continued Use of
Medium-Specific Analysis
While the Court's decision to grant the Internet such strong
constitutional protection will undoubtedly foster a much greater
freedom of speech over the medium, its continued use of medium-
specific analysis to reach its decision raises doubts regarding the scope
of the impact of the decision on future forms of mass communication.
The Supreme Court's review of the CDA's constitutionality represent-
ed an opportunity to move First Amendment jurisprudence in one of
two directions: down the well-trodden path of complex medium-
specific analysis, 36 or, more unlikely, down a novel path of First
Amendment jurisprudence where the Court would focus less on the
medium of communication and more on the goals of the First
Amendment as applied to any and all forms of communication.3 7
The Supreme Court took the more predictable course in Reno v.
ACLU," following the wealth of precedent governing content-based
regulation of different forms of mass communications by applying a
medium-specific analysis.3 9 Considering the range of forms of mass
communications, with print at one end garnering the highest level of
First Amendment protection24 and broadcast communications at
the other end meriting the lowest level of First Amendment protec-
and Technology, a policy group opposing the CDA).
236. See supra Part I.C (discussing judicial responses to government regulation of existing
forms of mass communication).
237. Cf Note, The Message in the Medium: TheFirst Amendment on the Information Superhighway,
107 HARv. L REv. 1062, 1062-63 (1994) (arguing that technological characteristics of various
types of mass communications should not be crucial factor in determining level of First
Amendment protection that a message receives).
238. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
239. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997).
240. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing strong First Amendment
protection afforded print medium).
1986
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don,241 the Court determined that Internet communication falls
much closer to the print end of the spectrum.2  Thus, the Court
applied strict scrutiny to the government action regulating Internet
content.
24
By choosing to follow its First Amendmentjuisprudence and apply
medium-specific analysis to the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, the Court
bypassed an opportunity to dispose of the complicated, awkward
analysis. Had it chosen a new course, the Court could have adopted
a novel First Amendment analysis which focuses not on the specific
medium of communication over which the content is transmitted, but
on whether the content transmitted has the potential to contribute to
the marketplace of ideas on any communications medium.
2 1
Under such a "marketplace" analysis, all forms of speech-other
than those already denied First Amendment protection such as
obscenity and child pornography--would receive the highest level
of First Amendment protection regardless of the medium over which
the communication is transmitted.2" It seems only logical that the
constitutionality of a person's expression should depend not on
whether it is conveyed by print, television broadcast, or the Internet,
241. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text (providing background on lesser free
speech protection given broadcast television and radio).
242. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court's application
of medium-specific analysis in Reno).
243. Seesupra notes 203-32 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
review of the CDA in Reno).
244. Harvard Law School Professor Laurence H. Tribe suggests that a medium-specific
analysis, which focuses so narrowly on the technological characteristics of each medium and the
risks of harm that those new mediums carry with them, results in an obfuscation of goals and
values behind the First Amendment. See Tribe, supra note 2 (arguing that a review of cases
where Court applies medium-specific analysis reveals a "curious judicial blindness, as if the
Constitution had to be reinvented with the birth of each new technology"). Tribe points out
that medium-specific analysis results in a recitation of the risks each new form of communication
carries with it without analyzing how imposing those risks "comports with the Constitution's
fundamental values of freedom, privacy, and equality." Id (arguing that such an analysis has
resulted, in particular, in the unwise regulating of radio and television broadcasts without
adequate sensitivity to First Amendment values).
245. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (discussing obscenity and child pornogra-
phy).
246. Professor Tribe, in a speech on the Constitution's application in the growing world of
technology and communications, argued that the Constitution's norms "must be invariant under
merely technological transformations." Tribe, supra note 2. In his speech, Tribe went so far as
to propose an amendment to the Constitution that would ensure that the Constitution,
particularly the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, would be read "through a technologically
transparent lens." I& Tribe proposed that the Constitution's Twenty-seventh Amendment read.
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and
assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, shall be construed
as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or medium through
which information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled.
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but on whether the expression is constitutional by its nature, and is
acceptable on any form of communication.
247
While the holding in Reno v. ACLU would have been the same
whether the Court used a medium-specific analysis or a medium-
neutral "marketplace" analysis, the adoption of the latter Holmsian
approach would have resulted in a new First Amendment jurispru-
dence under which virtually any speech, in any context or on any
medium, would be allowed, as long as a substantial government
interest does not outweigh the interest in allowing a free marketplace
of ideas to flourish, and as long as that government interest is
achieved using the least restrictive means. Thus all forms of speech,
other than those previously deemed unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny analysis, would be recognized as essential to the sustenance
of the marketplace of ideas, and in turn the democratic foundation
of our country.
B. The Future of Communications Regulation and the Internet
When Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke of the First Amendment's
primary goal of promoting a marketplace of ideas, he never said that
the means used to enter the marketplace should determine what one
is allowed to say once within. Holmes stressed that the value of free
speech is in letting any speech,2' through any medium, compete
against all others; the distillation of such competition would be truth
and a healthy discourse which would sustain the democratic ideal.
2 49
It is ironic, then, that Congress sought to place stronger restrictions
on speech over the Internet than on any other form of communica-
tion, 0 especially considering the fact that Congress itself recog-
247. See 142 CONG. REc. S695 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (questioning
the constitutionality of regulating speech on Internet where similar speech has been protected
by courts on consistent basis when communicated through other mediums); Note, supra note
287, at 1063 (pointing out that political editorial is still political editorial whether printed in
newspaper, broadcast on television, downloaded to computer, or faxed over phone line, and
arguing that "[t]he Court should ground its analysis in essential First Amendment interests and
draw upon salient technological characteristics only as the factual background against which the
real First Amendment concerns must be applied"); cf. Mike Godwin, The Difference Between
Obscenity and Indecency (visited Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/
Mikeodwin/obscenityand.indecency-godwin.excerpt> (noting that if banning on-line
indecency was constitutional, the expression of many things that could be said through writing
or public speaking would be criminal if expressed on the Internet).
248. Holmes did acknowledge, however, that speech which created a clear and present
danger was not protected by the First Amendment. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
(discussing Holmes' opinion in Schenck v. United States, 24 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
249. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (explaining marketplace of ideas theory
of First Amendment).
250. SeeSilvergate, supra note 110, atA19 (declaring that with passage of CDA, "[o]vernight,
the federal government transformed the newest and freest medium of communication into the
1988
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nized that the Internet does more to facilitate Holmes' marketplace
of ideas than any other form of communication in history.21 The
chief criticism of Holmes' theory over the years has been that it is too
utopian and impractical due to the economic barriers associated with
having one's voice heard in the marketplace. 52 The Internet,
however, breaks down these barriers, offering an egalitarian form of
communication where the cost is little or nothing and an opinion is
instantaneously distributed worldwide. 55 In many ways, the Internet
embodies the essence of democracy: equal participation.'
Congress' uninformed, myopic view of the Internet led to the
passage of an ill-conceived and indefensible law. Before Congress
passed the Communications Decency Act, it collected no evidence
that the existing laws had failed to prevent crime on the Internet.255
Even more, by refusing to hold hearings to adequately inform
themselves of the nature of the Internet, Congress passed a law that
attempted to achieve an admittedly compelling government interest,
protecting children, by means that were patently absurd.255
most heavily censored"). Scholars have also questioned Congress' logic in placing the harshest
restrictions on a medium of communication that is much less responsible than other mediums
for the distribution of pornography. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,
45 EMORY LJ. 869, 885 (1996) (asking why, if most indecent, pornographic material gets traded
over the counter rather than across the Net or over phones, has "the greatest portion of
Congress's attention. been focused on por on the wires rather than porn on the streets").
251. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a) (3) (West Supp. 1997) (proclaiming that Internet "offer[s] a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity").
252. See, ag., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affl, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997) (noting that critics have long attacked Holmes' marketplace theory of First Amendment
jurisprudence as being inconsistent with economic and practical reality); TRIBE, supra note 54,
§ 12-1 (questioning whether Holmes' analogy of market is an apt one and whether a free trade
in ideas is likely to generate truth, "especially when the wealthy have more access to the most
potent media of communication than the poor"); Ingber, supra note 17, at 16-17, 38-39 (arguing
that theory of marketplace of ideas has been flawed in the past because mass media, the only
vehicle for disseminating views widely, was accessible only to select portion of society due to
monopolistic practices, economies of scale, unequal distribution of resources, and limitations
of mass communication technology).
253. See supra notes 4-6, 105-08 and accompanying text (discussing democratic virtues of
Internet).
254. See supra notes 4-6, 107 and accompanying text (emphasizing decentralized and
egalitarian nature of Internet).
255. See supra notes 128-82 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' decision to design
laws specific to the Internet based largely on a Time magazine cover story).
256. Congress' attempt to regulate content over the Internet at its source, when the amount
of content grows exponentially every day, is not only unrealistic, but is counterintuitive to the
technology and framework of the Internet. See Cate, supra note 6, 1 97 (noting technological
impossibility of monitoring or controlling voluminous content of Internet transmissions); Meeks,
supra note 129 (arguing that because every day brings an explosion of new content on web sites,
newly formed newsgroups and new postings, bulletin board topics, mailing lists, etc., such a
"logarithmic proliferation of message traffic makes comprehensive screening for lewd or obscene
messages practically impossible"). Further, a law that institutes a nationwide ban on all Internet
indecency, aside from being so broad as to impinge on constitutionally protected speech, would
1990 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1945
Had Congress taken the time to study the Internet before blindly
censoring it, it would have realized that the objective of the constitu-
tionally-unsound law it was drafting could be much more effectively,
and much less intrusively, achieved with filtering software specifically
designed to monitor the global wanderings of Net-surfing chil-
dren. 7 In the wake of the Court's decision, Internet advocates," 8
legislators, 9 and the White House" have recognized that in lieu
have no effect on over thirty percent of the "indecent" material on the Internet that originates
from outside the United States. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd
117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997) ("Because the ODA only regulates content providers within the United
States, while perhaps as much as thirty percent of the sexually explicit material on the Internet
originates abroad .... the CDA will not reach a significant percentage of the sexually explicit
material currently available."). If a teenager wants to download a photograph deemed indecent
by Congress, he or she can just as easily obtain that photograph from Malaysia as from Montana.
257. Congress, because of its lack of knowledge or diligence, overlooked a variety of means
of protecting America's children without compromising the First Amendment. Specifically,
Congress overlooked the only way known using today's technology to effectively block certain
types of material from reaching the eyes and ears of children: filtering software. Filtering
software allows a parent to choose exactly what appears or does not appear on the computer
screen, regardless of from where in the world the materials originate. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp.
at 839-42 (detailing types of user-based software that allow parents to prevent children from
accessing materials that parent find undesirable); see also Chong, supra note 105, at *14-15
(urging parents to be proactive in preventing harm to their children by signing up only with
computer online services that have parental control and by using filtering software that helps
block access to all Internet sites except those that parents choose to make available to their
children). But see Eugdne Volokh, Speech and Spillover, StATE (July 18, 1996)
http://www.slate.com/Featurel/96-07-18/Featurel.asp> (arguing that filtering software is not
an alternative to banning on-line indecency because the software, while less restrictive, is also
less effective than the CDA would be in shielding minors from indecent material). See generally
Mike Godwin & Hal Abelson, Criticism of Volokh Article (July 30, 1996)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Mike-Godwin/HTML/960730-godwin abelson-filter
jetter.html> ("Thanks to these inexpensive and highly adaptable tools [filtering software and
other technical solutions], two important social interests-the protection of children and the
preservation of First Amendment rights-need no longer be viewed as opponents in a zero sum
game."). One critic of the CDA takes the debate a step further, arguing that the job of
protecting children from indecent material lies with neither software developers nor Congress,
but with parents. See Silvergate, supra note 110, at A19 (insisting that if courts do not leave
responsibility of protecting children to parents, "the government will exercise the power to act
as parent to all of us, and a giant hole will have been carved in the First Amendment").
258. See EFFPress Release, supra note 233 (arguing that low low-cost technical solutions such
as filtering software, when coupled with existing obscenity laws, "offer a less intrusive and more
efficient answer to questions about protecting children in the online world"). The EFF press
release, quoting vice president and general manager of SurfWatch Software, further notes that
the courts, as well, have been convinced that "parental control software like SurfWatch is a much
more effective and less restrictive solution than excessive government regulation." Ld. Some
Internet advocates, however, have warned that reliance on filtering software and the creation
of a self-regulating ratings system could pose considerable threats to open and robust speech
on the Internet. See ACLU White Paper Fahrenheit 451.2. Is Cyberspace Burning? (visited Nov. 15,
1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html> (arguing that if filtering software must
be included in all browsing software by legislative mandate, a system will likely develop whereby
filtering software blocks all speech that is left unrated-which, because of great time and cost
involved in rating Internet content, could be a significant amount of material-and where those
who mis-rate material will be subject to criminal prosecution).
259. Two bills currently being considered in the House of Representatives seek to require
Internet service providers to provide filtering software to all of their subscribers. See Family-
Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180, 105th Cong. (amending Communications Act
1997] RENO V. ACLU 1991
of legal regulation of the Internet, such filtering software and industry
self-regulation are the best options when considering how to protect
children while safeguarding the First Amendment.
Despite the wisdom behind such a hands-off approach, however,
many legislators at the federal and state levels have continued their
efforts to regulate the content of speech on the Internet.26' While
their intentions for the most part have been good, their actions run
the risk of destroying the greatest vehicle ever available to enter and
maintain the marketplace of ideas guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.262 With the specter of future regulation turning the right of
free speech into the right of controlled, tempered speech, the
Supreme Court must decide how easily it will allow free speech, the
touchstone of democracy and the cornerstone of our country, to be
muted.
26
of 1934 to require Internet access providers to offer all customers "screening software that is
designed to permit the customer to limit access to material that is unsuitable for children");
Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 774, 105th Cong. (requiring Internet
service providers to provide screening software to all subscribers).
260. In response to the Court's decision, President Clinton discussed the need to develop
a solution for the Internet "that protects children in ways that are consistent with America's free
speech values." Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Communications Decency
Act, 33 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES. DOc. 975 (June 26, 1997) (observing that while the Internet is "an
incredibly powerful medium for freedom of speech and freedom of expression that should be
protected. ... there is material on the Internet that is clearly inappropriate for children....
[W]e must give parents and teachers the tools they need to make the Internet safe for
children."). The White House's proposed solution recognizes the dangers of government
regulation and instead suggests that industry self-regulation (including competing rating systems)
and filtering software provide the best options. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 25 (stating
Administration's support for "industry self-regulation, adoption ofcompetingrating systems, and
development of easy-to-use technical solutions (e.g., filtering technologies and age verification
systems) to assist in screening information online").
261. See, e.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, S. 1237, 104th Cong. § 3(5)
(expanding definition of child pornography to include computer creation of pictures made to
appear that a minor was used); S. 1762, 104th Cong. § 1088 (1996) (making distribution on
Internet of information relating to explosive materials for a criminal purpose a crime punishable
by up to 20 years imprisonment); Bergstein & Cohen, supra note 159, at S1 (observing that CDA
is unlikely to be last effort to legislate Internees content); see also ACLU, The Threat of State
Censorship Bills (visited Nov. 15,1997) <http://ww.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/stbills.html>
(describing online censorship legislation passed in at least 11 states in past two years).
262. See CLINTON & GORE, supra note 7, at 25 (recognizing that "unnecessary regulation
could cripple the growth and diversity of the Internet"); supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text
(praising Internet as embodiment of First Amendment ideals). Scholars have also noted the
potentially disastrous effects that U.S. regulation of the Internet could have on global
communications. SeeJohn T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARv.
INT'L Lj. 207, 208 (1997) (examining regulation of Internet in United States, Germany, and
China, and observing that political pressure prompting the creation of "draconian national
regulation" could render the Internet's potential unfulfilled).
263. A Washington Post editorial held out hope that Congress' ill-fated attempt to regulate the
Internet with the CDA might have taught at least one lesson, observing that it is "unlikely that
the Net, in its complexity, will remain totally free of regulation of any kind. After this debacle,
though, perhaps future rounds will take at least some account of constitutional realities."
Editorial, Yes, the Net Is Speech, WASH. POsT., June 27, 1997, at A24.
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CONCLUSION
The greatest protection the Court can give to the future of the First
Amendment is the application of strict scrutiny to any government
regulation that impinges on the freedom of speech, regardless of the
medium of communication over which the speech is transmitted.
Such protection would be guaranteed by a new "marketplace"
approach to the regulation of mass communications, whereby the
focus would shift from a concentration on the medium over which the
content is transmitted, to whether the content transmitted has the
potential to contribute to the marketplace of ideas on any communi-
cations medium.
Under this marketplace analysis, there would always be the chance
that some expression of speech might run counter to the greater
interests of the country, but those instances should be few and far
between. The proper balance would still lie in applying a standard by
which only the most compelling government interests, when applied
using the least restrictive means possible, will override the interest in
protecting free speech.
As Judge Dalzell pointed out in ACLU v. Reno, the absence of
governmental regulation of the Internet has unquestionably created
a type of chaos, where indecent, "discordant voices" go largely
unchecked.2" What Congress failed to realize was that the strength
of the Internet is this chaos, and that very similarly, "the strength of
our liberty depends on the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects."2" While some of the
"discordant voices" might be regarded as indecent to some, they still
deserve the protection of the First Amendment. Whether the Court
in the future continues its use of medium-specific analysis, or whether
it veers down a new, clearer road of First Amendment jurisprudence,
it must recognize that the Internet is the most democratic, participato-
ry form of mass speech ever developed, and as such, any speech
flowing over it deserves a level of constitutional protection equal to
that lofty American ideal.
264. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("True it is that many find
some of the speech on the Internet to be offensive, and amid the din of cyberspace many hear
discordant voices that they regard as indecent. The absence of governmental regulation of
Internet content has unquestionably produced a kind of chaos. .. ."), affld, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
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